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T HIS Article attempts to codify the Texas rules of evidence. In so
doing, the organization and chronology of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence are followed; thus it is suggested that a copy of the federal rules be
kept nearby for ready reference. When the federal rules conform to the
Texas law the applicable federal rule is quoted without change in the text,
and supporting Texas authority is cited and discussed in the comments and
accompanying footnotes. When Texas law differs from the federal rules the
text of the rule so reflects, and explanatory discussion and citation again are
found in the comments and footnotes. The miscellaneous rules set out in
article XI of the federal rules are not within the scope of this Article and
have been omitted.
The purpose of this Article is to reflect, not to reform, the Texas law of
evidence. Thus, in most instances the stated rules adhere to current Texas
law, be it right or wrong. Any ideas for improvement are generally confined
to the comments. At times, however, a zeal for improvement within the rule
itself proves irresistible.
The frequent citation of Texas Courts of Civil Appeals cases that have
been "refused n.r.e.," ''dismissed w.o.j.," or have "no Writ history" is
with full awareness that they are less than persuasive authority. Neverthe-
less, for jurisidicational and other reasons' the Texas Supreme Court's
coverage of the rules of evidence has not been complete and thus many
"well accepted" rules have no better authority. Finally, Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals opinions are also cited in support of rules. In the unfortu-
nate instances, in which civil and criminal rules differ an effort has been








These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration,
*B.A., LL.B., University of Texas. Associate Professor of Law, St. Mary's University.
The author is deeply grateful to his colleague, Professor L. Wayne Scott, for his suggestions
and assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Salinas, 160 Tex. 445, 448, 333 S.W.2d 109, 112 (1960) (supreme
court's jurisdiction limited to "questions of law" and to "error[s] of substantive law"); TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1728 (Vernon 1962).
2. FED. R. EvID. 101, 102 do not involve substantive rules of evidence and, thus, are
adopted without change in these rules. Whether rule 101 would apply to administrative tribunals
is subject to debate and has not been considered by any Texas court.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth
may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.3
Rule 103
RULINGS ON EVIDENCE
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a
ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of
the party is affected, and(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a
timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the
specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent
from the context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence,
the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer
in the form of bill of exception or was apparent from the context
within which questions were asked.
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or
further statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form
in which it was offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. The
court may direct the making of an offer in question and answer form.
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted,
to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from
being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or
offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.
(d) Fundamental error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice
of fundamental errors affecting substantial rights although they were
not brought to the attention of the court.
Comments
Rule 103(a)(1), supported by ample Texas authority, recognizes the need
for "timely" objection in order to preserve error. An objection made after
the answer is "timely" only if the objection is not apparent from the
question, and a motion to strike must be made as soon as the objection
becomes apparent.'
Texas requires that a specific ground accompany each objection,5 a re-
quirement of easy application except when the objection is that the evidence
is "immaterial, irrelevant and prejudicial." 6 The last clause of rule 103(a)(1),
3. Phillips v. State, 511 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Lyles v. State, 171 Tex. Crim.
468, 351 S.W.2d 886 (1961); South Tex. Elec. Coop. v. Ermis, 3% S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ.
App-Corpus Christi 1965, no writ); Withers v. Tyler County Lumber Co., 326 S.W.2d 173
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
4. South Tex. Elec. Coop. v. Ermis, 3% S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1965, no writ); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Ellison, 232 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1950, no writ); Valdez v. O'Connor, 17 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1929, no
writ).
5. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Haddad, 142 Tex. 624, 180 S.W.2d 339 (1944); Campbell v.
Paschall, 132 Tex. 226, 121 S.W.2d 593 (1938); Spencer v. State, 438 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1969).
6. In Bridges v. City of Richardson, 163 Tex. 292, 354 S.W.2d 366 (1962), the court stated
that "immaterial and irrelevant" is normally too general to preserve error unless the evidence is
in fact "irrelevant and immaterial." The court of criminal appeals is even stricter. See, e.g.,
Vela v. State, 516 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), in which the State offered evidence of
the deceased's good character and the defense objected to it as being "irrelevant, immaterial
and inflammatory." The court held the objection too general, finding that the defense should
have said "improper character evidence." See also Rich v. State, 510 S.W.2d 5% (Tex. Crim.
App. 1974); Spencer v. State, 438 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). In Xanthull v. State, 172
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which allows for the absence of such specific ground when it is apparent
from the context, is supported by dicta from several civil appeals opinions
7
and appears to reflect the general consensus of modern Texas courts.
The language of rule 103(a)(2) is too broad to be literally supported by
statements from Texas opinions but the spirit of the Texas cases hovers
close by. Texas courts, however, have definitely required that the substance
of rejected evidence be made a part of the record;8 hence, problems arise
over how substantial the offer must be. The accepted Texas procedure
requires that the evidence be set forth in a bill of exception, a procedure
which, though no longer strangled in formality, is still recognized in Texas. 9
A full statement by counsel in the record, outlining the substance of the
proposed evidence, should be sufficient.10 The final clause of this rule,
preserving error that "was apparent from the context within which ques-
tions were asked" finds support in a recent Texas Supreme Court opinion."'
Cautious practitioners, however, should take care to resolve any doubts by
use of the bill of exception.
Rule 103(b) is supported by provisions in civil and criminal procedural
rules. 2 Rule 103(c) also can be inferentially supported by procedural rules 13
although its provisions are so obvious that few advocates have dared to
contend otherwise and, thus, little direct supportive authority exists. Final-
ly, the concept of "plain error," embodied in Federal Rule 103(d), is univer-
sally accepted in Texas under the doctrine of "fundamental error.' 14
Rule 104
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions con-
cerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a
privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its deter-
mination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with
respect to privileges.
Tex. Crim. 481, 358 S.W.2d 631 (1962), however, the court stated that a general objection is
sufficient if the evidence is inadmissible for any purpose.
7. Sternenberg v. Marshall, 257 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1953, writ- ref'd
n.r.e.); Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Tannahill, 235 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1950, writ dism'd); Turner v. Hodges' Estate, 219 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
8. Galindo v. Garcia, 145 Tex. 507, 199 S.W.2d 499 (1947); Lyons v. State, 503 S.W.2d 254
(Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Mabry v. State, 492 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Bell v.
Hoskins, 357 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, no writ); City of Houston v. Huber,
311 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958, no writ).
9. Solis v. State, 492 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Morris v. City of Houston, 466
S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1971, no writ); TEX. R. Civ. P. 372; TEX. CODE CRIM.
PRoc. ANN. art. 40.09 (Vernon 1966).
10. Echols v. Wells, 510 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1974); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
40.09(6)(d) (Vernon 1966). But see Davidson v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 640, 288 S.W.2d 93 (1956),
in which the court found such a statement to be insufficient.
11. Echols v. Wells, 510 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1974).
12. TEX. R. Civ. P. 372(i); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 40.09(7) (Vernon Supp. 1976-
77).
13. TEX. R. Civ. P. 269(d); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.22(b) (Vernon 1966)
(limited to confessions and dying declarations).
14. McCauley v. Consolidated Underwriters, 157 Tex. 475, 304 S.W.2d 265 (1957); Ramsey
v. Dunlop, 146 Tex. 196, 205 S.W.2d 979 (1947).
1977]
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(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit
it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support
a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.
(c) Hearing of jury. As specified in Art. 38.22(b), Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall
in all cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on the
admissibility of dying declarations shall also be so conducted, and
hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so conducted when the
interests of justice require or when an accused is a witness, if he so
requests.
(d) Testimony by accused. The accused does not, by testifying upon
a preliminary matter, subject himself to cross-examination as to other
issues in the case.
(e) Weight and credibility. This rule does not limit the right of a
party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credi-
bility.
Comments
Texas case law 5 supports the first sentence of rule 104(a) as taken from
the correlative federal rules. The second sentence, liberating the court from
rules of evidence in making such preliminary determinations, does not have
specific case support but does conform to accepted Texas practice. Similar-
ly, Federal Rule 104(b) expresses commonly accepted Texas practice, al-
though no specific support in case law or statute can be found.
Rule 104(c) departs from the federal rules by making specific reference to
the statutory rule which requires such hearings.16 The second sentence of
rule 104(c) cannot be supported by specific authority but a contrary rule is
unimaginable. The safeguards to an accused expressed in rule 104(d) have
specific support in Texas with reference to hearings on confessions, 7 the
subject matter undoubtedly comprising the bulk of preliminary hearings.
The extension of this rule to encompass the defendant's testimony at any
preliminary matter, though phrased broadly, does not flaunt any Texas case
and is therefore retained.' 8
Rule 105
LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY
(a) When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one
purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is
admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its
proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly; but, in the absence of
15. Ditto v. Ditto Inv. Co., 158 Tex. 104,309 S.W.2d 219 (1958); Mackey v. State, 160 Tex.
Crim. 296, 269 S.W.2d 395 (1954); Rocha v. State, 148 Tex. Crim. 237, 186 S.W.2d 267 (1945);
Ollok v. United Heat Treating Co., 318 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958, no
writ); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.09 (Vernon 1966). See also Huffman v. State,
450 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), in which a witness's competency depended upon her
common law marriage to the defendant. The court allowed her testimony but instructed the jury
not to consider it if they found the marriage relationship existed.
16. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.22 (Vernon 1966). Such a hearing is required by
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
17. See, e.g., Lopez v. State, 384 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
18. The provisions of rule 104(e) enjoy obvious support in Texas as elsewhere. The rules
covering the admissibility of such evidence for weight and credibility purposes are found in
Articles IV and VI infra.
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such request the court's action in admitting such evidence without
limitation shall not be a ground for complaint on appeal.
(b) When evidence referred to in paragraph (a) above is excluded,
such exclusion shall not be a ground for complaint on appeal unless the
proponent expressly offers the evidence for its limited, admissible
purpose or limits its offer to the party against whom it is admissible. 9
Rule 106
REMAINDER OF OR RELATED WRITINGS
OR RECORDED STATEMENTS
When part of an act, declaration or conversation or writing is given in
evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired
into by the other, as when a letter is read, all letters on the same subject
between the same parties may be given. When a detailed act, declara-
tion, conversation or writing is given in evidence, any other act, decla-
ration or writing which is necessary to make it fully understood or to
explain the same may also be given in evidence.
Comment
Article 38.24 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure has been sub-
stituted here for Federal Rule 106 because it better expresses both the
general subject matter and the Texas law. The article also properly ex-
presses the practice in civil cases. 20 This article has been interpreted by the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to allow admission only of relevant mat-
ters contained in the additional act, declaration, conversation, or writing. 2'
ARTICLE I-JUDICIAL NOTICE
Rule 201
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ADJUDICATIVE FACTS
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudica-
tive facts.
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject
to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot rea-
sonably be questioned.
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether
requested or not.
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested
by a party and supplied with the necessary information.
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request
to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice
and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification,
the request may be made after judicial notice has been taken.
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage
of the proceeding.
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall
instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a
19. Section (b) has been added to rule 105 to reflect better the Texas common law. See,
e.g., Blum Milling Co. v. Moore-Seaver Grain Co., 115 Tex. 144,277 S.W. 78 (1925); Kaplan v.
Goodfried, 497 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, no writ); Fort Worth Hotel Co. v.
Waggoman, 126 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
20. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Creyke, 446 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1%9, no writ).
21. See, e.g., Roman v. State, 503 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
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criminal case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not
required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.
Comments
This rule follows Federal Rule 201 without change. Section (a), concern-
ing the scope of the rule, very wisely limits it to "adjudicative facts." As
explained in the Advisory Committee's note, it is next to impossible to
formulate a rule governing judicial notice of legislative facts. 22 Subdivision
(b), concerning the kinds of facts subject to judicial notice, is fully support-
ed by Texas cases which generally recognize judicial notice of "all matters
of science or common knowledge." 23 A substantial number of Texas cases
also approve judicial knowledge of matters that are "capable of accurate
and ready determination. 24 Texas courts also have the discretion to take
judicial notice unilaterally as provided in Federal Rule 201(c).25
The matters provided in subsections (d) through (g) of Federal Rule 201
have not been specifically covered by Texas appellate decisions. All of these
provisions, however, are reasonable and, therefore, are retained. Some
complaint has been made about the second sentence of subdivision (g) which
allows a jury in a criminal case to reject judicially noticed facts; 26 but, as
pointed out in the report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, this
provision is probably required by the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution.2 1 Moreover, the complaint is more theoretical than real for it is






In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by
legislation or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against
whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut
or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of
proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains through-
out the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
22. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS 10-13 (West 1975) (hereinaf-
ter cited as FEDERAL RULES].
23. Reynolds v. McMan Oil & Gas Co., I I S.W.2d 778, 784 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929,
holding approved). See also Harper v. Killion, 162 Tex. 481, 348 S.W.2d 521 (1961).
24. James v. State, 546 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (moon phases); Parish v. State,
523 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (time of sunset on a certain day); Rios v. State, 162 Tex.
Crim. 609, 288 S.W.2d 77 (1956) (population of cities and counties reported in the United States
Census); Parker v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 447 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1969, no writ) (value of foreign currency); Buckaloo Trucking Co. v. Johnson, 409 S.W.2d 911
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, no writ) (certain commonly known, easily ascertainable,
and indisputable facts); City of Irving v. Bull, 369 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (census figures).
25. Harper v. Killion, 162 Tex. 481, 348 S.W.2d 521 (1961); Buckaloo Trucking Co. v.
Johnson, 409 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, no writ).
26. Wood, The Federal Rules of Evidence, A Brief Outline and Commentary, 38 TEX. B.J.
535, 536 (1975).
27. FEDERAL RULES, supra note 22, at 16.
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Comment
Although the Texas common law is replete with problems, inconsisten-
cies, and exceptions 28 the accepted view of Texas civil cases regarding the
effect of a presumption is consistent with Federal Rule 301, and is therefore
retained without substantial change.
29
Rule 302
PRESUMPTIONS IN CRIMINAL ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS
In criminal actions and proceedings, the existence and effect of
presumptions shall be governed by the provisions of Section 205 of the
Texas Penal Code.30
ARTICLE IV-RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS
Rule 401
DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT EVIDENCE"
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. 31
Rule 402
RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE;
IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by
these rules or by other judicial or legislative authority. Evidence which
is not relevant is not admissible. 32
Rule 403
EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Comment
Texas courts have never expressly adopted the balancing procedure au-
28. 1 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 53 (2d ed. 1956). Additionally,
the discussion in Lents, Presumptions in Texas: A Study in Irrational Jury Control, 52 TEXAS L.
REV. 1329 (1974), is very instructive.
29. See the discussion and cases cited in I C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, supra note 28, §§ 41-
58. The only change made to the text of rule 301 was to change "Congress" to "legislature."
30. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 2.05 (Vernon 1974) fully covers the subject of presumptions in
criminal actions.
31. Rule 401 is adopted here because it reflects judicial interpretation of relevant evidence
by Texas courts. Many Texas cases contain a definition of relevant evidence substantially
similar to the federal rule. See, e.g., Pittman v. Baladez, 158 Tex. 372, 381, 312 S.W.2d 210, 216
(1958) ("[tihere must be some logical connection, either directly or by inference, between the
fact offered and the fact to be proved"); Knapp v. State, 504 S.W.2d 421,437 (Tex. Crim. App.
1973) (evidence is admissible if "it tends to prove the issue, or constitutes a link in the chain of
proof, and it is not to be rejected though standing alone it might not justify a verdict").
32. Texas cases recognize both the admissibility of relevant evidence (see, e.g., Lone Star
Gas Co. v. State, 137 Tex. 279, 153 S.W.2d 681 (1941); Knapp v. State, 504 S.W.2d 421 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1973)), and the inadmissibility of irrelevant evidence (see, e.g., Dallas Ry. &
Terminal Co. v. Oehler, 156 Tex. 488, 296 S.W.2d 757 (1956); Eckels v. State, 153 Tex. Crim.
402, 220 S.W.2d 175 (1949)).
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thorized by Federal Rule 403. They follow it sub silentio, however, and
often utilize a balancing process without express recognition of the rule.33
Such is the process in cases where clearly relevant evidence of prior crimes3 4
or prior claims35 has been excluded. One Texas court went so far as to state
that "testimony is never excluded" for reasons of prejudice and proceeded
to justify its admission of the allegedly prejudiced evidence as though
Federal Rule 403 were guiding its every thought. 36
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has come closest to conscious
balancing. In a recent case it reiterated its belief that the proper test for
determining the admissibility of any evidence is whether its probative value
outweighs its inflammatory nature. 37 Accordingly, even without express
authority, it would seem contrary to Texas law to reject or even modify
Federal Rule 403.
Rule 404
CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE
CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character
or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving
that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same.(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character
of the victim of the crime as set forth in Articles 19.06 (homicide) and
21.13 (sex crimes) of the Texas Penal Code.
33. Ledisco Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Viracola, 533 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1976, no writ); Roberts v. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co., 276 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
34. Compton v. Jay, 389 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. 1965); Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1972).
35. San Antonio Traction Co. v. Cox, 184 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1916,
no writ).
36. Joy v. Peacock, 131 S.W.2d 1012, 1019 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1939), jdgmt set aside,
153 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1941) (emphasis added). In Hussmann v. Leavell & Sherman, 20 S.W.2d
829, 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1929), aff'd, 32 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930, jdgmt
adopted), the court went through a balancing process which could serve as a model for rule 403,
then ruined it all by finding that "a party cannot be deprived of the benefit of evidence which is
relevant and material because it may also have a tendency to prejudice the adverse party in the
eyes of the jury." In reversing on another ground the commission of appeals said: "We agree
with the rulings of the Court of Civil Appeals on the other assignments presented." 32 S.W.2d
at 645.
37. The only argument of significant strength that the State can make toward
admissibility of said proof that appellant while intoxicated on an occasion approx-
imately two and one-half years prior to the date of this offense pointed a pistol at
the head of deceased's brother is that such was relevant to show the effect of
alcohol upon appellant and her tendency toward belligerency and resort to
firearms when under its influence. In other words, that such proof is relevant on
the question of motive. Though said proof might be of some slight relevancy on
said question, such is certainly not what we deem to be material relevancy. All
evidence of a defendant's commission of collateral crimes has some slight rele-
vancy toward the likelihood of his committing an alleged crime, and especially so
where the collateral crime is similar in nature to the one charged against the
accused. However, as stated by this Court in Albrecht v. State. . . ,'The test for
determining admissibility of any type of evidence is whether the probative value
of such evidence outweighs its inflammatory aspects, if any.'
Mallicote v. State, 548 S.W.2d 42, 43-44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). See also Cobb v. State, 503
S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
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(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness,
as provided in rules 607, 608 and 609.
(4) Punishment hearing. Evidence of accused's prior criminal rec-
ord, general reputation and character at a hearing on proper punish-
ment as provided in Article 37.07, Section 3(a) of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident. 38p
Comment
The federal rule excluding character evidence finds support in both civil
and criminal cases in Texas, and is, therefore, adopted as rule 404(a). 39 The
exception set forth in rule 404(a)(1) regarding the accused's right to present
evidence of his good character and the state's right to rebut same also
reflects the federal rule and finds ample support in Texas case law.40
The rule 404(a)(2) exception concerning the victim's character is con-
trolled by the referenced sections of the Texas Penal Code. Under article
1258 of the old Texas Penal Code, the forerunner of article 19.06 of the
present Code, there were additional requirements that there be evidence of
aggression or threats by the victim and knowledge of the victim's bad
character on the part of the defendant. 41 These requirements, however, were
based on express language in article 1258 that was omitted from present
article 19.06. Texas courts should honor the plain legislative intent to allow
"all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and the previ-
ous relationship existing between the accused and the deceased ' 42 to be
entered into evidence. Additionally, the state's right to introduce rebuttal
evidence concerning the victim's character is limited to cases in which the
accused has offered evidence on the subject or seeks to justify his actions
on grounds of threats. 43
Rule 405
METHODS OF PROVING CHARACTER
(a) Reputation. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait
38. The provisions of rule 404(b) are substantially supported by opinions of the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals. See Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). See
also Jones v. State, 376 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
39. Compton v. Jay, 389 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. 1965); Gant v. State, 513 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1974); Bell v. State, 433 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Grant v. Pendley, 39 S.W.2d
596 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, holding approved).
40. See Hicks v. State, 493 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), in which the court allowed
the defendant to present evidence of good character, and Lowe v. State, 166 Tex. Crim. 116,
312 S.W.2d 382 (1958), in which the State was allowed to rebut the character evidence
presented by the accused.
41. See, e.g., Mahaffey v. State, 471 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1018 (1972).
42. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.06 (Vernon 1974).
43. Hatley v. State, 533 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). Rules 607-609 adequately
dispose of the matter of the admissibility of evidence supporting or attacking the character of a
witness which is the subject of rule 404(a)(3). Additionally, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.07, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) controls the admissibility of character evidence at a
punishment hearing due to the presence of bifurcated trials in Texas.
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of character of a person is admissible, proof is limited to testimony as to
reputation in the community where such person resides or where he is
best known. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable as to whether
the witness has heard of relevant specific instances of conduct on the
part of the person.(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a
trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim,
or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of his conduct.
Such proof may be made by extrinsic evidence or by direct inquiry on
cross-examination.
Comments
Rule 405(a) substantially changes the federal rule in deference to the
Texas practice of limiting character evidence to evidence of reputation, 44
and of limiting inquires on cross-examination to the "have you heard" type
of interrogatories. 41 Although proof of character is seldom attempted in civil
cases, the Texas law is in no way offended by the above quoted version of
rule 405(a). Federal Rule 405(b), allowing proof of specific instances of
conduct in cases in which character is directly in issue, is supported by
Texas cases, hence its inclusion in this proposed codification. 47 The final
sentence makes clear that the "have you heard" formality does not apply
when character is an essential element of the case.
Rule 406
HABIT; ROUTINE PRACTICE
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an
organization is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or
organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit
or routine practice.
Comments
There is a paucity of Texas cases on the subject matter of Federal Rule
406, particularly with respect to the routine practice of an organization.
There is, however, persuasive authority favoring admission of trade cus-
tom, 4 thus inferring acceptance of routine practice when sufficiently estab-
lished. Texas courts have gone farther than most states in admitting proof of
individual habits when properly established.49
The federal rule admits habit and routine practice "whether corroborated
or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses.' '50 Texas case history
appears to require the presence of an eyewitness, at least in cases where
44. Smith v. State, 414 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) ("[t]he inquiry as to
character must be limited to the general reputation of the person in the community of his
residence or where he is best known"). See also Gholson v. State, 542 S.W.2d 395, 402-03 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1976), in which the court held that inquiry as to one's opinion of a witness's
character is not permitted.
45. Vance v. State, 365 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963); Edmund v. State, 169 Tex.
Crim. 637, 336 S.W.2d 946 (1960). See also Wright v. State, 491 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Crim. App.
1973).
46. Grant v. Pendley, 39 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, holding approved).
47. Claiborne v. State, 100 Tex. Crim. 322, 273 S.W. 260 (1925); Moore v. Davis, 27 S.W.2d
153 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930, jdgmt adopted); Shely v. Harvey, 163 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
48. Stanley v. Southern Pac. Co., 466 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. 1971).
49. See Compton v. Jay, 389 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. 1965), and cases cited therein.
50. FED. R. EVID. 406.
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evidence of a deceased's habits is sought to be admitted in a wrongful death
action." Texas cases make no mention of a requirement of corroboration.
The above quoted phrase in the federal rules has been deleted in this




When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously,
would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subse-
quent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable con-
duct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the
exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for
another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
Comments
The general exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures when
offered to prove negligence or culpable conduct is well recognized in Tex-
as. 52 The admission of such evidence as proof concerning other legitimate
issues, such as to show the condition of the premises at the time of the
accident, to rebut a claim of infeasibility of repair, to explain a photograph
of the premises, or to rebut a claim that repair would not help the offending
condition, has long been allowed by Texas courts. 53 Federal Rule 407,
therefore, has been adopted without change in this instance.
Rule 408
COMPROMISE AND OFFERS TO COMPROMISE
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2)
accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in
compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed
as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or
invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements
made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule
does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable
merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiation.
This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered
for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness,
negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct
a criminal investigation or prosecution.
Comments
Although worded more elaborately than necessary, the basic policy of
Federal Rule 408, rendering statements made during compromise negotia-
51. Missouri K.T.R.R. v. McFerrin, 156 Tex. 69, 291 S.W.2d 931 (1956). Annot., 28
A.L.R.3d 1293 (1969), indicates that the eye witness requirement applies only in wrongful death
actions when habits of the deceased are offered. The McFerrin facts fit this limitation but the
language of the opinion is much broader.
52. Texas Trunk R.R. v. Ayres, 83 Tex. 268, 18 S.W. 684 (1892); Railway Express Agency
v. Spain, 249 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1952), writ dism'd, 152 Tex. 198, 255
S.W.2d 509 (1953); S. Blickman, Inc. v. Chilton, 114 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1938,
no writ).
53. St. Louis, A. & T. Ry. v. Johnston, 78 Tex. 536, 15 S.W. 104 (1890); Winnsboro Cotton
Oil Co. v. Carson, 185 S.W. 1002 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1916, no writ).
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tions inadmissible, is well supported by Texas authorities.54 There are also
Texas cases admitting relevant portions of such negotiations for other pur-
poses." There is little or no support in Texas case law for the provision in
the federal rule admitting "evidence otherwise discoverable" even though
"presented in the course of compromise negotiations." The provision is
retained, however, as it is inconceivable that Texas courts would allow a
litigant to avoid the admission at trial of relevant, discoverable facts simply
by admitting them during compromise negotiations.
Rule 409
PAYMENT OF MEDICAL AND SIMILAR EXPENSES
(a) In a lawsuit being tried before a jury for damages for personal
injuries which resulted from an occurrence which is also the basis for a
claim for property damage and/or payment of medical expense, no
evidence is admissible which informs the jury that the property damage
claim or medical expense has been paid or settled.
(b) In any civil action in which a party or someone on his behalf,
such as his insurer, has made an advance payment prior to trial, any
evidence of or concerning the advance payment shall be inadmissible at
the trial on liability or damages in any action brought by the claimant,
his survivor, or his personal representative to recover damages for
personal injuries or related damages, for wrongful death of another, or
for property damage or destruction.56
Rule 410
INADMISSIBILITY OF PLEAS, OFFERS OF PLEAS,
AND RELATED STATEMENTS
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of a plea of guilty,
later withdrawn, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the
crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made in connection
with, and relevant to, any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not
admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who
made the plea or offer. A plea of nolo contendere may not be used
against the party making it as an admission in any civil suit based upon
or growing out of the act upon which the criminal prosecution is based.
However, evidence of a statement made in connection with, and rele-
vant to, a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, a plea of nolo contendere, or
an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any
other crime, is admissible in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false
statement if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on
the record, and in the presence of counsel.
Comments
Federal Rule 410 has been altered here to conform to Texas law on pleas
of nolo contendere," and to eliminate an ambiguity in the federal rule which
54. Sullivan v. Missouri K.T. Ry., 110 Tex. 360,220 S.W. 769 (1920); Krenek v. South Tex.
Elec. Coop., 502 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no writ).
55. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Barrett, 366 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1963,
no writ) (settlement negotiations admitted to refute claim of undue delay). One recent opinion
even has allowed proof of an admission of liability made during negotiations. See Spiritas v.
Robinowitz, 544 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
56. The provisions of art. 3737f, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and of § 3 of art. 3737g,
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, have been substituted for the federal rule in this area. TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 3737(f), (g) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77). Sections 1 and 2 of subsection(g) supplement the text with relevant definitions and statements of coverage. Id.
57. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.02(5) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
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literally provides that a plea of nolo contendere is not admissible even in the
proceeding in which it is entered. This literal inconsistency is plainly con-
trary to congressional intent, will never enjoy judicial acceptance, and,
therefore, has been removed in this Texas codification. It is submitted that
this vestige of poor draftsmanship should also be removed from the federal
rule. The Texas rule with respect to the inadmissibility of offers to plead
guilty conforms to the correlative portion of Federal Rule 410.58 Although no
Texas case authority can be found, it may be presumed that this rule would
extend to offers to plead nolo contendere.
Also, Texas courts apparently have not decided the question of the
admissibility of withdrawn pleas of guilty, or of nolo contendere, either in
civil cases or in the criminal proceeding in which the plea was entered.5 9 By
analogy to civil procedure, such withdrawn guilty pleas would be admitted
as are superseded pleadings in civil cases. 60 Strong policy considerations
differentiate withdrawn guilty pleas from superseded civil pleadings, 6 how-
ever, and in deference to such considerations the federal rule prohibiting
admission of withdrawn guilty pleas has been retained in the absence of
contrary Texas statute or decision.62
Rule 411
LIABILITY INSURANCE
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not
admissible upon the issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise
wrongfully. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of
insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as
proof of agency, ownership, or control, if disputed, or bias or prejudice
of a witness.
Comments
Texas cases approve the exclusion of evidence of liability insurance or the
lack of it, 63 but admit the existence of insurance when offered for other
purposes, such as to explain the delay of the plaintiff in presenting the
claim, 61 to show agency,65 to show ownership and control,66 or to show bias
and interest of a witness. 67 A requirement that matters such as agency and
58. Stafford v. State, 125 Tex. Crim. 174, 67 S.W.2d 285 (1934); Dean v. State, 72 Tex.
Crim. 274, 161 S.W. 974 (1913).
59. Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 326, 332 (1962), describes the Dean case as "frequently cited as
authority re withdrawn pleas." According to Shepards Citator, however, Dean has only been
cited once and that was in Stafford v. State, 125 Tex. Crim. 174, 67 S.W.2d 285 (1934),
involving an offer to plead guilty.
60. Long v. Knox, 155 Tex. 581, 291 S.W.2d 292 (1956).
61. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 265 (2d ed. 1972).
62. This represents a tightening up of the federal rule as originally passed. See FEDERAL
RULES, supra note 22, at 38-40.
63. Dennis v. Hulse, 362 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1962); Southland Greyhound Lines v. Cotten,
126 Tex. 596, 91 S.W.2d 326 (1936).
64. West Tex. State Bank v. Tri-Service Drilling Co., 339 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
65. Conner v. Angelina County Lumber Co., 146 S.W.2d 1093 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1941, no writ).
66. Harper v. Highway Motor Freight Lines, 89 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1935,
writ dism'd).
67. Barton Plumbing Co. v. Johnson, 285 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1955,
writ ref'd); Aguilera v. Reynolds Well Serv., 234 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1950, writ ref'd).
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ownership be disputed before proof of liability insurance is admissible has





(a) In addition to the guarantees in the Constitutions of the United
States and of Texas establishing privileges against self-incrimination,
the following privileges shall be recognized in Texas:
(1) The husband and wife privilege as provided in Article 3715,
Vernon's Texas Statutes Annotated, and in Article 38.11, Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure.
(2) The attorney-client privilege as provided in Article 38.10, Tex-
as Code of Criminal Procedure.
(3) The clergyman-penitent privilege as provided in Article
3715(a), Vernon's Texas Statutes Annotated.
(4) The privilege concerning communications by drug abusers pro-
vided in Article 38.101, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
(b) Nothing in this rule shall affect any statute or judicial decision
pertaining to the admission or exclusion of confessions or of evidence
obtained as a result of searches and seizures in and on a defendant's
person or premises.
Comments
Federal Rule 501 does not establish any specific privileges but simply
refers generally to those existing under federal or state common law or
statute. 8 The above rule embodies a catalogue of existing privileges under
Texas law. Article 3715 of the Civil Statutes and article 38.11 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure establish the husband-wife privilege in Texas. The latter
is somewhat redundant and confusingly combined with provisions rendering
spouses incompetent witnesses in criminal action. Although neither statute
expressly so provides, Texas courts have abrogated the husband-wife
privilege in most suits between spouses.69
Article 38.10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is the only statutory
authority for the attorney-client privilege, but the civil courts have described
its forerunner as "a statutory declaration of the commoi-law rule of evi-
dence [that] applies to both criminal and civil cases." 7"
The clergyman-penitent privilege provided by article 3715(a), Vernon's
Civil Statutes varies the proverb "what the Lord giveth the presiding judge
taketh away." Its final clause provides that "the presiding judge in any trial
may compel such disclosure if, in his opinion, the same is necessary to a
proper administration of justice." 7'
Article 38.101 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies only to com-
68. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
69. Fasken v. Fasken, 113 Tex. 464, 260 S.W. 701 (1924); Spearman v. State, 68 Tex. Crim.
449, 152 S.W. 915 (1913). TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.11 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) lifts
the spouse's incompetency in cases involving crimes against the other spouse or children, but
does not expressly lift the privilege in such cases.
70. Williams v. Williams, 108 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1937, no writ).
71. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3715(a) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
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munications made during or precedent to "voluntary treatment," thus leav-
ing open the question of whether disclosures made during court-ordered
treatment or examination are protected by the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation or any other privilege.
Rule 501(b) is simply an express disclaimer of any intention to meddle
with principles of constitutional law.
ARTICLE VI-WITNESSES
Rule 601
COMPETENCY AND INCOMPETENCY OF WITNESSES
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise
provided in these rules. The following witnesses shall be incompetent to
testify in any proceeding subject to these rules:
(1) insane persons and children as provided in Article 38.06, Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure.
(2) spouses in criminal proceedings under circumstances provided
in Article 38.11, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
(3) parties in actions by or against executors, administrators or
guardians as provided in Article 3716, Vernon's Texas Statutes An-
notated.
Comments
Rule 601 embodies the three statutory disqualifications of witnesses in
Texas. First, the incompetency of insane persons and children as provided
in article 38.06 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. This disqualifica-
tion is to be determined by the trial judge according to the statutory stan-
dards and procedures.72 Second, article 38.11 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure disqualifies spouses as witnesses in criminal proceedings. The
incompetency of spouses is lifted when they testify "for each other" and in
certain cases involving offenses by one against the other or against the
children. 73 Third, the Dead Man's Statute, codified in article 3716 of the
Civil Statutes, operates to disqualify parties as witnesses in certain suits
described in the statute.
Both civil and criminal statutes reject religious belief or the lack of it as a
ground for incompetency. 74 Additionally, civil statutes expressly repeal any
incompetency of convicted felons, 75 of parties to the suit, and of persons
due to their race.76 The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure also inferentially
provides for the competency of witnesses in the aforementioned categories
by stating that all witnesses except those described in articles 38.06 and
38.11 are competent to testify.77
Rule 602
LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced
72. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 38.06, .09 (Vernon 1966).
73. Id. art. 38.11 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
74. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3717 (Vernon 1926); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art.
38.12 (Vernon 1966). See also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 5.
75. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3717 (Vernon 1926).
76. Id. art. 3714.
77. TEX. CODE CRIM. Poc. ANN. art. 38.10 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
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sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the
matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not,
consist of the testimony of the witness himself. This rule is subject to




Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that he
will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form
calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his mind with his duty
to do so. 79
Rule 604
INTERPRETERS
An interpreter is subject to the provisions of these rules relating to
qualification as an expert and the administration of an oath or affirma-
tion that he will make a true translation.80
Rule 605
JUDGE AS WITNESS
The judge presiding at a trial may not testify in that trial as a witness.
No objection need be made in order to preserve the point.
Comments
Rule 605 admittedly is contrary to Texas law. Article 38.13 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure which provides that "the trial judge is a compe-
tent witness. .. " has been applied and approved in a d.w.i. case in which
the trial judge was allowed to testify that he was the magistrate before whom
the defendant was brought after arrest and that he believed the defendant
was intoxicated. 2 Two civil cases have indicated in dicta that the trial judge
may testify as to any facts within his personal knowledge.8 3 The federal rule,
however, is favored over the above cited Texas authority which appears to
violate the due process requirements of the Constitution.84 Lastly, the sec-
ond sentence of Federal Rule 605 is needed to protect counsel from appear-
ing to oppose "truth and justice" before the jury.
78. The provisions of rule 602 have long enjoyed support in Texas. See, e.g., Texas & Pac.
Ry. v. Reed, 88 Tex. 439, 31 S.W. 1058 (1895).
79. Rule 603 is supported by TEX. CONST. art. I, § 5.
80. Rule 604 has substantial support in the provisions of TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art.
3712(a) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77), TEX. R. Civ. P. 183, and TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.30 (Vernon 1966).
81. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.13 (Vernon 1966).
82. Kemp v. State, 382 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
83. Great Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Flint, 336 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1960,
no writ); Conyer v. Burckhalter, 275 S.W. 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1925), writ dism'd, 7
S.W.2d 73 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted).
84. What could be more unfair than for the trial judge to solemnly descend to the witness
stand, displaying the halo of impartiality that bar association public relations has placed around
his brow. Consider the scene from the juror's viewpoint: after entering the court room to the
pomp and circumstance of "oyez, oyez!" and "everyone rise, please!," together with other
ceremonies designed to super-dignify him, the judge takes the witness stand (would he submit
to the oath? would he condescend to remove his robe? would everyone rise as he descends?)
and proceeds to tell the adoring jury what the facts really are; then, after less than vigorous
cross-examination by counsel, his honor would solemnly ascend to the bench, take up his gavel,
and resume the role of impartial arbiter. If this is due process in a civil or criminal proceeding,
then what is not?
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Rule 606
COMPETENCY OF JUROR AS WITNESS
(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a witness
before that jury in the trial of the case in which he is sitting as a juror. If
he is called so to testify, the opposing party shall be afforded an
opportunity to object out of the presence of the jury.85
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry
into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to
any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's
mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the
verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection
therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's
attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to
bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement
by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from
testifying be received for these purposes.'
Rule 607
IMPEACHMENT GENERALLY
(a) The credibility of a witness may be attacked by the opposing
party by proof of bias, interest, inconsistent statements, traits of
character affecting credibility, any impairment or disability affecting
credibility, or by any other circumstance which the trial court believes
would reasonably affect the credibility of the witness.
(b) A witness may also be impeached by the opposing party by
cross-examination or extrinsic evidence contradicting the witness' tes-
timony on matters directly in issue or matters affecting the witness'
credibility, as provided in these rules, but a witness may not be im-
peached by contradiction on collateral matters unless in the opinion of
the trial judge the impeachment evidence gives promise of exposing
falsehood or should be admitted in the interests of justice.
(c) The credibility of a witness may not be attacked by the party
placing him on the stand or by a party with like interests without a
showing that such witness' testimony is injurious to said party's cause
and that the nature of the witness' testimony surprised said party, and
in no event may such party offer evidence of such witness' bad
character.
Comments
The federal rules do not adequately cover the area of impeachment; thus,
substantial additions have been included in rule 607. Specifically, only two
of the common grounds for impeachment-bad character and inconsistent
statements-are mentioned in the federal rules, and nothing is mentioned
about support by proof of consistent statements of the witness. Such omis-
sions admittedly simplify the rules. A complete codification, however,
should inform litigants whether and how a foundation should be laid to
85. Rule 606(a) is merely a codification of common sense and enjoys support in Texas. See,
e.g., Reis v. State, 130 Tex. Crim. 541,95 S.W.2d 700 (1936); Gregory v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 377
S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1964), revid on other grounds , 387 S.W.2d 27 (Tex.
1965).
86. Rule 606(b) conforms to the general civil practice and the requirements of criminal
procedure. See Pope, The Mental Operation of Jurors, 40 TEX. L. REV. 849 (1962). See also
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 40.03(7) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
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impeach for bias, when and to what extent a witness can be contradicted,
and when and how a litigant may support his witness' testimony. The
additions here and those made in connection with rule 613 are attempts to fill
these gaps reflecting the common law in Texas.
Texas authorities allow impeachment for bias, interest or prejudiceY
inconsistent statements, a8 lack of character for veracity,89 and for relevant
impairments.' While the catch-all phrase contained in rule 607(a) above is
not supported by specific Texas authority, no case authority suggests that
the accepted forms of impeachment are exclusive.
Rule 607(b) reflects the Texas law concerning impeachment by way of
contradiction. Rule 607(b) also reflects the fact that Texas courts are sur-
prisingly rigid concerning contradiction on "collateral matters," 91 even by
way of cross-examination. 92 The final phrase in the rule is taken from a court
of civil appeals opinion which states that "[t]he rule of admissibility of
evidence of this nature [impeachment on collateral matters] should be liberal
and the trial judge should have the discretion to receive any evidence which
gives promise of exposing falsehood." 93 This, it is hoped, correctly reflects
the Texas law.
Rule 607(c) is contrary to Federal Rule 607 which allows a witness to be
attacked by any party, including the party calling him. The rule instead
reflects current Texas law, which allows impeachment of a party's own
witness' only upon a showing of surprise and injurious testimony.' The
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure purports to allow impeachment of a
party's own witness without a showing of surprise,' but the Court of
Criminal Appeals nevertheless consistently exacts the requirement.' Article
38.28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is the basis for prohibiting the
impeachment of a party's own witness on grounds of bad character.
87. Evans v. State, 519 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Parsons v. State, 102 Tex.
Crim. 524, 278 S.W. 444 (1925).
88. Smith v. State, 520 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Birch v. Howard, 435 S.W.2d
945 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
89. Compton v. Jay, 389 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. 1965); Thrash v. State, 482 S.W.2d 213 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1972); Garza v. Garza, 109 S.W.2d 1079 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1937, writ
dism'd).
90. Bouldin v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 419, 222 S.W. 555 (1920) (insanity); Wren v. Howland,
75 S.W. 894 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903, writ ref'd) (senility).
91. It is recognized that "collateral matters" are defined, if at all, only by negative
inference, but this was the only method for defining the term if the article was ever to be
finished.
92. Gatson v. State, 387 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965); Christie v. Brewer, 374 S.W.2d
908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); 1 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, supra note 28,§ 683.
93. Royal v. Cameron, 382 S.W.2d 335,342 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
94. Phlegm v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 453 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1970, no writ); Federal Underwriters Exch. v. Rattler, 192 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
95. Morgan v. Stringer, 120 Tex. 220, 36 S.W.2d 468 (1931); Wall v. State, 417 S.W.2d 59
(Tex. Crim. App. 1967); Phlegm v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 453 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, no writ).
96. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.28 (Vernon 1966).
97. Williams v. State, 521 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Wall v. State, 417 S.W.2d 59
(Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
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Rule 608
EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OF WITNESS
(a) Reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness
may be attacked or supported by evidence of the reputation of such
witness as to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Evidence of
truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness
for truthfulness has been attacked by reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct
of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility,
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be
proved by extrinsic evidence nor inquired into on cross-examination.
(c) Waiver. The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by
any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of his privilege against
self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate
only to credibility.
Comments
Rule 608(a) excludes the "opinion" evidence concerning character for
truthfulness that the federal rule allows because Texas courts permit inquiry
only into the reputation of the witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness. 98
The provision allowing support of a witness by proof of good reputation
only after the witness' character for truth has been attacked has long been
the rule in Texas. 99 In determining when a witness' character for truth has
been attacked in a manner justifying such support, Texas courts have
exhibited considerable permissiveness, allowing such support after a show-
ing of inconsistent statements'00 or of acts of misconduct.10' Mere contradic-
tion of a witness' testimony through other evidence, however, does not
ordinarily constitute an attack on the character of a witness sufficient to
justify the introduction of support evidence. 02
Federal Rule 608(b) permits the court to allow inquiry into specific acts of
misconduct short of conviction of a crime. Such inquiry is not allowed in
Texas. 0 3 Therefore, rule 608(b) expressly prohibits evidence of or inquiry
into specific acts of misconduct not resulting in a conviction. Finally,
although Texas courts have not spoken on the proposition, the last para-
graph of the rule follows Federal Rule 608 for it appears eminently rea-
sonable that Texas courts, if faced with the question, will follow this
common-sense codification.
Rule 609
IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTION OF CRIME
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness, evidence that he has been finally convicted of a crime shall be
98. Compton v. Jay, 389 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. 1965); Thrash v. State, 482 S.W.2d 213 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1972); Garza v. Garza, 109 S.W.2d 1079 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1937, writ
dism'd).
99. International-Great N. Ry. v. Hailey, 9 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1928), cert.
denied, 280 U.S. 558 (1929).
100. Robertson v. State, 81 Tex. Crim. 378, 195 S.W. 602 (1917).
101. Garcia v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. 380, 22 S.W.2d 658 (1929).
102. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Raney, 86 Tex. 363, 25 S.W. 11 (1894); Livestock Feeder Co. v.
Few, 397 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
103. Christie v. Brewer, 374 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.29 (Vernon 1966).
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admitted if elicited from him on cross-examination or established sepa-
rately by public record or both, but only if the crime (1) constituted a
felony under the law under which he was convicted, or (2) constituted a
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, or (3) involved dishonesty or
false statement.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not
admissible unless the trial court determines that it was sufficiently
recent in time to have some bearing upon the present credibility of the
witness.
(c) Pardon. The fact that a final conviction, otherwise admissible
under these rules, has been the subject of a pardon, does not render
such conviction inadmissible, but the fact of the pardon is also admis-
sible.
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is not
admissible under this rule.
(e) Pendency of appeal. Only final convictions are subject to proof
hereunder; thus the pendency of an appeal from such conviction ren-
ders evidence of the conviction inadmissible.
Comments
Substantial alterations have been made in Federal Rule 609 to reflect
Texas law correctly. First, the terminology in rule 609(a) describing the type
of crime subject to proof has been changed to reflect the rule in criminal
cases admitting proof of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude. °1 A different standard is imposed in civil cases, where proof only
of crimes involving moral turpitude is allowed; even a felony is not an
impeachable offense unless believed to involve moral turpitude. 105 The rule
in criminal cases has been favored here because it is simpler and more
precise. The final classification of crimes involving dishonesty or false
statement is probably redundant; usually such a crime is either a felony or a
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. 106
Another change in rule 609(a) involves the manner of presentation of the
conviction. The federal rule appears to require that the conviction must be
elicited from the witness or established by public record during cross-
examination. The Texas courts allow evidence to be solicited either on
cross-examination or by separate proof of the public record, or both. 1° 7
Lastly, the federal rule provision allowing the trial judge to reject the
conviction upon finding that its probative value is outweighed by its prejudi-
cial effect to the defendant has been deleted. It is doubtful that Texas trial
judges have such discretion other than by applying the remoteness factor set
forth in rule 609(b), or possibly by "balancing" under rule 403, above.
The arbitrary ten year cut-off in Federal Rule 609(b) has been revised to
104. Rivas v. State, 501 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Stephens v. State, 417 S.W.2d
286 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
105. Landry v. Travelers Ins. Co., 458 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1970); Compton v. Jay, 389 S.W.2d
639 (Tex. 1965).
106. This is implied in the opinion of the court in Compton v. Jay, 389 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.
1965).
107. Martini v. State, 371 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 1%3) (approves use of both the
record and cross-examination); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Curry, 290 S.W.2d 767 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (approves use of records); Bernard's, Inc. v. Austin,
300 S.W. 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1927, writ ref'd) (approves use of cross-examination).
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adopt the more flexible "remoteness" standard followed in Texas.0 8 In
determining whether a conviction is remote, the judge is to look to the date
of the witness' release from prison rather than to the date of conviction. The
judge may reach further back in time if intervening convictions indicating
lack of rehabilitation have occurred. 1°9 While Texas trial judges lack the
express authority granted by the federal rules to accept or reject evidence of
a conviction based on a judgment of its probative value measured against its
prejudicial nature, the flexible "remoteness" standard does give them some
discretion in determining the probative value of the conviction with similar
results.
Federal Rule 609(c) provides that a pardon, annulment, certificate of
rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure renders evidence of the convic-
tion inadmissible. This rule has been changed to conform to the Texas rule
that a pardon does not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible.' 10
On the other hand, Texas courts, in contradistinction to Federal Rules
609(d) and 609(e), have disallowed evidence of both juvenile convictions"'
and convictions with appeals pending.' '2 In the latter situation inadmissibili-
ty is preferable since an injustice could occur if a conviction were used to
impeach and possibly convict a witness in one case followed by a reversal of
the conviction on appeal and an acquittal on re-trial.
Rule 610
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OR OPINIONS
Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion
is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their
nature his credibility is impaired or enhanced." 3
Rule 611
MODE AND ORDER OF INTERROGATION
AND PRESENTATION
(a) Control by court. The court shall exercise reasonable control
over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting
evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective
for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of
time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrass-
ment. A question and answer form of interrogation should be favored
over a narrative form unless full development of the testimony requires
otherwise.
108. See Landry v. Travelers Ins. Co., 458 S.W.2d 649, 650-51 (Tex. 1970) (citing I C.
MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 660 (Supp. 1968)), in which the court held
that "the conviction must have been 'sufficiently recent in time to have some bearing on the
present credibility of the witness.' " See also Stephens v. State, 125 Tex. Crim. 397, 68 S.W.2d
181 (1934), in which the court of criminal appeals decided that "evidence of a conviction is not
admissible if the trial court finds it too remote to bear upon the credibility of the witness." The
wording of the rule is a combination of these two opinions.
109. Williams v. State, 449 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
110. Sipanek v. State, 100 Tex. Crim. 489, 272 S.W. 141 (1925); Bernard's, Inc. v. Austin,
300 S.W. 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1927, writ ref'd).
Ill. Warran v. State, 514 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Rivas v. State, 501 S.W.2d
918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.13 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
112. Ringer v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 242, 129 S.W.2d 654 (1938).
113. Although this rule would undoubtedly be unquestioned by any modern court, it finds
express acceptance in only one case in Texas, Brundige v. State, 49 Tex. Crim. 596, 95 S.W.
527 (1906). The comments to FED. R. EVID. 610 point out that religious beliefs or affiliation may




(b) Scope of cross-examination. Subject to special rules limiting
cross-examination, e.g., in cases of a spouse testifying for a spouse in
criminal cases or an accused testifying as to admissibility of a con-
fession, a witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any
issue of the case, including credibility.
(c) Leading questions. Leading questions should not be used on the
direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop
his testimony. Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on
cross-examination. When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse
party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may
be by leading questions.
Comments
While there is no specific statutory or judicial authority approving the
specific language of Federal Rule 611 (a), the criminal and civil procedural
rules in Texas do give the trial court general control over the presentation of
witnesses and evidence.I14 Thus rule 61 l(a), adopting the federal rule, accu-
rately reflects Texas law. A requirement has been added to rule 611(a): the
question and answer form of interrogation should be employed since this is a
strong message of Texas cases. "5
Federal Rule 61 l(b), which limits cross-examination to the subject matter
of direct examination, has been changed to provide for the wide open cross-
examination generally allowed in Texas courts." 6 Recognition has been
given to special situations in which cross-examination is limited; primarily
this occurs when a spouse is testifying for a spouse in criminal cases," 7 or
when an accused party is testifying concerning a confession." Rule 611 (c)
which adopts the federal rule unchanged reflects the general rule in Texas
disallowing the use of leading questions on direct examination, 1 9 although
normally leading questions are considered harmless,'2 0 while allowing their
use on cross-examination 12 1 or in questioning an adverse party.
122
Rule 612
WRITING USED TO REFRESH MEMORY
If a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory for the purpose of
testifying, either
114. TEX. R. Civ. P. 265; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.01 (Vernon 1966); see Sueter
v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 578, 310 S.W.2d 81 (1958).
115. Deams v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 496, 265 S.W.2d 96(1954) (a court can require question
and answer form); Abramson v. Davenport, 269 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1954, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (a witness should be examined in question and answer form).
116. Evansich v. G.C. & S.F.R.R., 61 Tex. 24 (1884); Pride v. Pride, 318 S.W.2d 715, 719
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1958, no writ).
117. Mitchell v. State, 517 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
118. Lopez v. State, 384 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
119. St. John v. Moorman, 272 S.W. 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1925, no writ).
120. Bell v. State, 166 Tex. Crim. 340, 313 S.W.2d 606 (1958); Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v.
Randolph, 467 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, no writ).
121. Jones v. Travelers Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1964, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
122. TEX. R. Civ. P. 182. This rule allows leading questions only of adverse parties and has
been so interpreted. Bell v. Umstattd, 401 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1966, writ
dism'd). In view of the judicially recognized harmless nature of leading questions (see note 120
supra and accompanying text) and the broad supervisory powers given to the trial courts over
presentation of evidence, however, it is unlikely that allowing leading questions of a truly
hostile witness would be considered reversible error. Thus, FED. R. EvID. 611(c) has not been
limited to the literal import of rule 182.
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(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is
necessary in the interests of justice,
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing,
to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in
evidence those portions which relate to the testimony of the witness. If
it is claimed that the writing contains matters not related to the subject
matter of the testimony the court shall examine the writing in camera,
excise any portions not so related, and order delivery of the remainder
to the party entitled thereto. Any portion withheld over objections shall
be preserved and made available to the appellate court in the event of an
appeal.
Comments
Federal Rule 612, regarding the introduction of writings used to refresh
memory is closely reflective of Texas law 123 and has not been substantially
changed. There is some indication in Texas that if the writing is not actually
used at the trial, it is not available to opposing counsel, 24 but this precedent
would not prevent a court from acting "in the interests of justice" as
provided in the federal rule. The last sentence of Federal Rule 612,125
dictating the consequences of a refusal to produce the writing, has been
deleted for want of Texas authority either for or against the procedure and
because it is a procedural matter inappropriate to a code of evidence. No
violence would be done to the Texas law by leaving this provision in the
rule, particularly the innocuous phrase allowing the court to "make any
order justice requires."
Rule 613
PRIOR STATEMENTS OF WITNESS;
IMPEACHMENT AND SUPPORT
(a) Examining witness concerning prior inconsistent statement. In
examining a witness concerning a prior inconsistent statement made by
him, whether oral or written, and before further cross-examination
concerning, or extrinsic evidence of, such statement may be allowed,
the witness must be told the contents of such statement, and the time
and place and the person to whom it was made, and must be afforded an
opportunity to explain or deny such statement. If the witness une-
quivocally admits having made such statement, extrinsic evidence of
same shall not be admitted. This provision does not apply to admissions
of a party opponent as defined in Rule 803(1).
(b) Examining witness concerning bias, etc. In impeaching a witness
by proof of circumstances or statements showing bias, interest or the
like on the part of such witness, and before further cross-examination
concerning, or extrinsic evidence of, such bias, interest or the like may
be allowed, the circumstances supporting such claim or the details of
such statement, including the contents and where, when and to whom
made, must be made known to the witness, and the witness must be
given an opportunity to explain or to deny such circumstances or
123. Morgan v. State, 491 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Putnam v. Pannell, 507
S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, no writ); Paul v. Johnson, 314 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1958, writ dism'd).
124. Gaskin v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 7, 353 S.W.2d 467 (1962); McGregor v. Gordan, 442
S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
125. FED. R. EVID. 612.
1977]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
statement. If the witness unequivocally admits such bias, interest or the
like extrinsic evidence of same shall not be admitted. A party shall be
permitted to present evidence rebutting any evidence impeaching one of
said party's witnesses on grounds of bias, interest or the like.(c) Prior consistent statements of witnesses. Prior statements of a
witness which are consistent with said witness' testimony shall be
allowed only
(1) If said witness is impeached on grounds of bias, interest or the
like and such consistent statement was made before the facts and
circumstances creating such bias, interest or the like arose, or
(2) If said witness is impeached by a showing or suggestion that said
witness was a silent at a time when he would be expected to speak out
concerning the subject matter of his testimony and said consistent
statement is one that was made at or about the time that such witness
would have been expected to speak out concerning the subject matter
of his testimony.
Comments
With more valor than clarity, Federal Rule 613 attempts to abolish or at
least modify the "foundation" prerequisite to showing inconsistent state-
ments on the part of witnesses. It is arguable that this is a worthwhile,
although certainly not a crucial, objective. Texas law, however, definitely
requires the familiar laying of a predicate prior to impeachment of witnesses
by proof of inconsistent statements or of bias. 26 Therefore, Federal Rule
613 has been altered to provide a foundation requirement. The last sentence
of rule 613(b), making this requirement inapplicable to proof of admissions
of a party opponent, conforms to Texas law.127 The federal rule applies
generally to any "prior statement," and this has been narrowed here to
"inconsistent" statements.
The subject matter of rule 613(b) is not covered by the federal rules which
leave practitioners to the mercies of outside sources to determine how to
impeach witnesses on grounds of bias, interest or the like. Rule 613(b),
requiring some foundation and opportunity to explain or deny as a prerequi-
site to the offering of extrinsic evidence of bias or interest, and affording a
right of rebuttal, is in accordance with general Texas rules. 128 Since one
purpose of laying a foundation is to save time in the event the impeaching
facts are admitted, Texas recognizes that an unequivocal admission by a
witness that a prior inconsistent statement was made, or that a bias exists,
eliminates the need and thus the admissibility of extrinsic evidence of the
admitted fact. 129
The rule 613(c) provisions regarding the support of witnesses by proof of
consistent statements is another subject not covered by the federal rules.
The provisions of rule 613(c) which allow such statements only when made
126. Huffman v. State, 479 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Citadel Constr. Co. v. Smith,
483 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Garcia v. Sky Climbers, Inc.,
470 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Carrick v.
Hedrich, 351 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1961, no writ).
127. Contreas v. San Antonio Traction Co., 83 S.W. 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904, no writ).
128. See I C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, supra note 28, §§ 680-681.
129. Sloan v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. 131, 84 S.W.2d 484 (1935); Employers Liab. Assur. Co.
v. Groningen & King, 299 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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prior to the circumstances showing bias, interest, or recent fabrication are
generally supported by Texas cases.130
Rule 614
CALLING AND INTERROGATION OF WITNESSES BY COURT
(a) Calling by court. The court may, on its own motion or at the
suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-
examine witnesses thus called.
(b) Interrogation by court. Subject to rules prohibiting comments
on the weight of the evidence, the court may interrogate witnesses,
whether called by itself or by a party.
(c) Objections. Objections to the calling of witnesses by the court or
to interrogation by it may be made at the time or at the next available
opportunity when the jury is not present.
Comments
The interjection of the trial judge into the presentation of evidence must
be approached with extreme caution in Texas because of the strict rules
prohibiting comments on the weight of the evidence.' 3' There is authority, at
least in criminal cases, approving the calling of the witness by the trial judge
and, therefore, Federal Rule 614(a) has been adopted. 32 Although the feder-
al rule has not been altered, it is by no means certain that a Texas trial judge
has the authority to call a witness "at the suggestion of a party" and then
allow that party to cross-examine the witness.
Federal Rule 614(b), concerning the interrogation of witnesses by the
court, has been expressly limited by reference to the rule prohibiting judicial
comments. There is authority allowing the trial judge to ask clarifying
questions 3 and questions directed to the admissibility of the witness' tes-
timony. 134 Without question, a trial judge may freely interrogate witnesses in
non-jury cases. 135 Furthermore, despite the existence of judicial opinion
doubting the propriety of Federal Rule 614(c), 136 it nevertheless has been
retained because of the basic unfairness of requiring a party in the presence




Witnesses shall be excluded from the courtroom in accordance with
130. Cases in which consistent statements were admitted after bias was shown: Lewy & Co.
v. Fischel, 65 Tex. 311 (1886); Nations v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. 112, 237 S.W. 570 (1922);
Williams v. State, 67 Tex. Crim. 287, 148 S.W. 763 (1912). A case in which consistent
statements were admitted after recent fabrication: Barmore v. Safety Cas. Co., 363 S.W.2d 355
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Skillern & Sons v. Rosen, 359
S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1962). Some opinions by the court of criminal appeals seem to allow
consistent statements without any prior impeachment. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 504 S.W.2d
900 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). This liberality, however, has not been incorporated into the rule.
131. Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Britton, 134 Tex. 529, 135 S.W.2d 981 (1940); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.05 (Vernon 1966).
132. Pugh v. State, 69 Tex. Crim. 357, 151 S.W. 546 (1912).
133. Universal Underwriters Lloyds v. Sulik, 301 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1957,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
134. Milo v. State, 152 Tex. Crim. 401, 214 S.W.2d 618 (1948).
135. Marshall v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 167, 297 S.W.2d 135 (1956).
136. State v. Able, 369 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Rule 267, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and Articles 36.03-36.05 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.137
ARTICLE VII-OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
Rule 701
OPINION TESTIMONY BY LAY WITNESSES
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form
of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences
which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b)
helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of




If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or other-
wise. 139
Rule 703
BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him
at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts
in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the sub-
ject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Comments
This rule, adopting Federal Rule 703 without change, allows an expert to
base an opinion or inference on (1) personal knowledge, (2) facts made
known at the trial (a) by testimony of other witnesses or (b) by hypothetical
questions, and (3) outside sources if of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the subject area. All of these are recognized by Texas authorities.
The use of personal knowledge as a source is the most direct and obvious."4
The use of facts properly testified to by other witnesses is acceptable 4 ' and
the hypothetical question provides the most common source of expert
opinion.' 42 Texas law also approves the use of outside sources, whether
admissible or not, with emphasis on the requirement that they be "of a type
137. TEX. R. Civ. P. 267 and TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. arts. 36.03-.05 (Vernon 1966)
provide the procedural methods for "invoking the rule" in Texas litigation.
138. FED. R. EvID. 701, adopted here, is generally supported by Texas authority. See, e.g.,
City of Fort Worth v. Lee, 143 Tex. 551, 186 S.W.2d 954 (1945); Farley v. M & M Cattle Co.,
515 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974), revdon other grounds, 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.
1975); Coils v. Price's Creameries, Inc., 244 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1951, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
139. Here again, FED. R. EVID. 702 is well supported, in fact paraphrased, by Texas
authority. See, e.g., Loper v. Andrews, 404 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1966); Hopkins v. State, 480
S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Burns v. Bridge Eng'r Corp., 465 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
140. John F. Buckner & Sons v. Allen, 289 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1956, no
writ).
141. Davis v. State, 54 Tex. Crim. 236, 114 S.W. 366 (1908); Bates v. Barclay, 484 S.W.2d
955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
142. Carr v. Radkey, 393 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1965); Atkinson v. State, 511 S.W.2d 293 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1974).
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reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject." This includes use of reports of others in the
field, 4 3 economic data,'" and learned treatises. 45 A recent case recognizes
that a physician, even one employed solely to give testimony, may base his
opinion on case history and other relevant statements of the patient.
46
Rule 704
OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admis-
sible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of the fact. 147
Rule 705
DISCLOSURE OF FACTS OR DATA UNDERLYING
EXPERT OPINION
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his
reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or
data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event
be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examina-
tion.
Comments
Federal Rule 705, adopted here, probably does not accurately express the
mainstream of Texas case law which requires that hypothetical questions
include all basic facts.14 Inferential support for this rule, however, may be
found in the cases that express the matter permissively' 49 -that an expert
may give basic facts underlying his opinion-thus implying that such facts
need not be disclosed. In view of the liberal discovery procedures in Texas it
is inconceivable that a well-prepared attorney at the time of trial would not
know the adverse expert's opinion and supporting data. Further, in view of
the saving clause in rule 705 which guarantees that the data at least will be
disclosed on cross-examination, it appears clear that rule 705, in Texas
courts as in federal courts, is a streamlining measure that can only benefit
litigants on both sides of the case. Therefore, the federal rule has been
adopted as a codification of the present trend of Texas case authority.
Comment on Omission of Federal Rule 706
Federal Rule 706, allowing the trial court to appoint expert witnesses,
143. Sutherland v. McGregor, 383 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1964, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (petroleum engineer properly based opinion upon test reports of others); Gray v. Bird,
380 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (psychiatrist using reports of
others, and of psychologists); Schooler v. State, 175 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.) (geologist using geological reports of others).
144. Lewis v. Southmore Sav. Ass'n, 480 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1972); State Banking Bd. v.
Proposed Bayport Bank, 516 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Williams v. G.M. Corp., 501 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
145. Urquhart v. Barnes, 335 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1960, no writ).
146. Slaughter v. Abilene State School, 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 35 (Oct. 26, 1977).
147. This rule is well supported by Texas authority. See, e.g., Carr v. Radkey, 393 S.W.2d
806 (Tex. 1965); Hopkins v. State, 480 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
148. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Co. v. Dodd, 528 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




enjoys little support in Texas case history. Except for the general authority,
codified herein as rule 614, allowing the court to call witnesses, there is no
Texas authority specifically permitting the trial judge to call an expert
witness. On the other hand, there is no specific prohibition of such a
practice, except for the sanctions against commenting on the weight of the
evidence, which are arguably violated by allowing the trial judge to call an
expert while allowing the jury to know that he has done so. If the procedure
allowed by Federal Rule 706 were adopted, it would have the effect of giving
prominence to the opinion of the court appointed expert in apparent con-
tradiction to the prohibition of judicial comment on the evidence. 50
Noted scholars are in favor of the practice sanctioned by Federal Rule
706,151 and the Federal Advisory Committee touts the rule as a reform to
eliminate "shopping for experts" and "the venality of some experts." The
notion, however, of allowing a court's "pet expert" virtually to decide
every contested law suit is not an unqualified "reform." It is doubtful that a
court-appointed expert, known by the jury to be such, could testify under
Texas law, and, since keeping the jury in the dark would present more
problems than the practice would eliminate, the federal rule has been elimi-




The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or
(2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an
assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "Declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Comments
Defining "statement" to include nonverbal conduct only if intended as an
assertion is admittedly contrary to the line of judicial thought which regards
implications from conduct as hearsay if a direct statement to the same effect
would be hearsay.152 Nevertheless, the definition in the federal rule, em-
bodying the notion that non-assertive conduct is non-hearsay, is both sens-
ible and thoroughly consistent with the policies justifying the hearsay rule.
Thus its adoption here. It is believed that a Texas court, if now directly
confronted with the issue, would so hold. 153
150. See Levy, Impartial Medical Testimony-Revisited, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 416 (1961).
151. See, e.g., 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2484 (1940).
152. Wright v. Doe D. Tatham, 7 Ad. & El. 313, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Ex. 1837). The few
Texas cases in which the problem is raised seem to follow the view taken in the Wright case.
See, e.g., Powell v. State, 88 Tex. Crim. 349, 227 S.W. 188 (1921); Allen v. Reliable Life Ins.
Co., 394 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see St. Louis
S.W. Ry. v. Arkansas & Tex. Grain Co., 95 S.W. 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906, writ dism'd)(admitting evidence of buyers' failure to complain of quality of corn). See also the discussion in
I C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, supra note 28, § 784, in which the use of the word "seem" in the
comment is explained.
153. See McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE L.J. 489 (1930). The federal
rules' definition of hearsay embodied in rule 801(c) is the same as that given by Texas courts.
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Federal Rule 801(d) is omitted in its entirety. It establishes as non-hearsay
(1) certain prior statements of witnesses and (2) admissions of a party
opponent. In Texas prior statements are admitted only for purposes of
impeachment and support under the rules set forth in article VI above and
are admitted as primary evidence only if they fall within some recognized
exception to the hearsay rule.
1 4
Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(C) describes as non-hearsay a prior statement of a
witness if it is "one of identification of a person made after perceiving him."
This type of statement is admissible in Texas but as an exception to the
hearsay rule rather than as non-hearsay. 5 Therefore, the rule governing the
admissibility of these types of statements appears as a subsection to 803,
below. Similarly, Texas regards an admission of a party opponent as an
exception to the hearsay rule, 156 and consequently such admissions are also
covered under rule 803, below.
Rule 802
HEARSAY RULE
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by
other rules prescribed by act of the Legislature.'
Rule 803
HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS; AVAILABILITY OF
DECLARANT IMMATERIAL
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining
an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event
or condition, or immediately thereafter.
Comment
Texas is one of the few state jurisdictions that recognizes this excep-
tion. 5 l It is uncertain whether Texas courts would authorize the final phrase
'or immediately thereafter."
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition.
Comment
Texas has recognized this exception when the declaration is spontaneous,
See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331, 337 (Tex. 1963);
Salas v. State, 403 S.W.2d 440, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).
154. See i C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, supra note 28, § 785, and cases cited therein.
155. See Turner v. State, 486 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972), and cases cited therein.
See also Thames v. State, 453 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 408
U.S. 937 (1972). Actually the decision to regard previous identification as an exception to the
hearsay rule is only inferentially supported by these cases which admit such evidence upon the
sole ground that it is "not improper." Turner v. State, supra, at 800.
15. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. 1963).
157. This is FED. R. EvID. 802 changed only to conform to the political facts of Texas. There
is, quite obviously, no problem concerning the general exclusion of hearsay. In Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331, 337 (Tex. 1963) (quoting 1 C. MCCOR-
MICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 781 [2d ed. 1956]), the court stated that "the well-
accepted rule is [that] 'evidence of a statement made out of court when such evidence is offered
for the purpose of proving the truth of such previous statement is inadmissible as hearsay.' "
158. Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942); Anderson v. State,
454 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
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and is made without opportunity for reflection.' 59 In Texas the "startling
event or condition" must be established by evidence independent of the
declaration. 11
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A state-
ment of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation,
or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental
feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of
memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it
relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declar-
ant's will.
Comments
This exception includes several concepts. The first, relating to a statement
of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, or mental feeling
substantially reflects Texas law. 6' Texas also recognizes the Hillmon-type
expression of a declarant's intent, plan, or design offered to prove that the
declarant carried out such intent, plan, or design. 162 Additionally, statements
of a declarant's then existing physical condition or bodily health are allowed
in Texas whether made to a physician or to a layman.1
63
Texas has never expressly drawn Justice Cardoza's "high-water line" to
exclude "a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed,"'" but undoubtedly would do so if the issue arose. Statements of
memory or belief concerning a declarant's will are allowed in Texas pro-
vided they relate to the issue of whether the will was made or revoked or to
the issue of the testator's intent.165 Declarations of a testator concerning the
part played by third parties in influencing the making or contents of the will
are not admissible," 6 and the last clause of the above exception must be
interpreted to that effect.
Comment on Omission of Federal Rule 803(4)
Federal Rule 803(4) expresses the standard American view that state-
ments made to a treating physician concerning past or present symptoms
and concerning the history and causes of an injury, if relevant to diagnosis
and treatment, are admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule.' 67 Surpris-
ingly, Texas does not recognize this exception. These statements are ad-
159. Evans v. State, 480 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Furrh v. State, 168 Tex. Crim.
299, 325 S.W.2d 699 (1959); Jones v. Hopper, 506 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1974, no writ).
160. Truck Ins. Exch. v. Michling, 364 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. 1963).
161. Allen v. Riedel, 425 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1968, no writ); Houston
Chronicle Publishing Co. v. McDavid, 157 S.W. 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1913, no writ).
162. Davis v. Argonaut Sw. Ins. Co., 464 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1971); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Nelson, 142 Tex. 370, 178 S.W.2d 514 (1944); Lowe v. State, 163 Tex. Crim. 578, 294 S.W.2d
394 (1956); Chance v. State, 125 Tex. Crim. 318, 68 S.W.2d 212 (1933).
163. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Salinas, 160 Tex. 415, 333 S.W.2d 109 (1960); Miller Mut. Fire Ins.
Co. v. Oachoa, 432 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
164. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 105 (1933).
165. Compton v. Dannenbauer, 120 Tex. 14, 35 S.W.2d 682 (1931); Miller v. Miller, 285
S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1955, no writ).
166. Self v. Thornton, 343 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Edwards v. Williams, 292 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1956, no writ).
167. FED. R. EVID. 803(4); see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 61, § 92.
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missible to support a physician's diagnosis and opinion but not as substan-
tive evidence and, thus, not as exceptions to the hearsay rule.'8 According-
ly, this exception, although meritorious, has been omitted from this codifi-
cation.
(4) Admission by a party-opponent. A statement offered against a
party which is (A) his own statement, in either his individual or repre-
sentative capacity, or (B) a statement of which he has manifested his
adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by his agent employee
or other person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the
subject, or (D) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, or (E) in civil cases, a
statement by a person in privity of interest or obligation with a party to
the extent that the rights, obligations or remedies of the party are
affected by the acts of the declarant.
Comments
In terms of use and importance this exception should logically come first
under rule 803. It is inserted here, however, as a substitute for Federal Rule
803(4) so as to adhere as closely as possible to the chronology of Federal
Rule 803.
(A) Texas courts recognize admissions by a party opponent as an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule and do not require that the declarant be unavailable
or that the statement be against interest at the time it was made. 69 Such
admissions do not have the effect of judicial admissions; they are eviden-
tiary only and subject to contradiction and explanation.170
(B) Adoptive admissions 171 and tacit admissions'72 are also recognized
by Texas courts.
(C) Texas cases further allow representative admissions by persons
authorized to speak on the subject (which is a rare situation).173 The federal
rules allow such representative statements "concerning a matter within the
scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the
relationship,'1 74 but Texas courts have not gone this far. 75
(D) Statements made by co-conspirators during the course and in furth-
erance of the conspiracy are admitted in Texas as under the federal rules. 176
(E) The common law practice of admitting statements of persons in
privity of interest with parties is apparently rejected by the federal rules.
168. See Onker v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 131 Tex. 57, 112 S.W.2d 170 (1938); Advance
Loan Serv. v. Mandik, 306 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1957, no writ); Ray, Restric-
tions of Doctors' Testimony in Personal Injury Cases, 14 Sw. L.J. 133 (1960).
169. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. 1963).
170. Stafford v. Wilkinson, 157 Tex. 483, 304 S.W.2d 364 (1957).
171. Thornell v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 249 S.W.203 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, jdgmt
adopted); Insurance Co. of N. America v. Stroburg, 456 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1970), rev'd, 464 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1971). In reversing Stroburg the supreme court did not
object to the admissibility of the death certificate. It said that such was "subject to explanation
and rebuttal." 464 S.W.2d at 829.
172. Counts v. State, 149 Tex. Crim. 348, 194 S.W.2d 267 (1946).
173. See, e.g., Big Mack Trucking Co. v. Dickerson, 497 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. 1973).
174. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(d).
175. See, e.g., Big Mack Trucking Co. v. Dickerson, 497 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. 1973).
176. Womble v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 23, 301 S.W.2d 928 (1957); Aguero v. State, 164 Tex.
Crim. 265, 298 S.W.2d 822 (1957); Harang v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 400 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Though the position reflected by the federal rule appears the better rea-
soned, 17 7 Texas courts have chosen to admit "vicarious admissions,"' 78 thus
mandating the inclusion of rule 803(4)(E).
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a
matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insuffi-
cient recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately, shown to
have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in
his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly.
Comments
Texas cases announcing this exception are substantially in accord with the
federal rules,179 although most use the phrase "at or near the time"'180 rather
than the phrase, "when the matter was fresh in his memory" as provided by
Federal Rule 803(5). The federal version also contains a final sentence
providing that although such memorandum or record may be read into
evidence by the proponent, it does not become an exhibit unless offered by
the adverse party. This sentence has been omitted here as it appears to
contradict Texas case law, which regards the memorandum as evidence
when used.'
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. Business and hospital
records shall be admitted into evidence as an exception to the hearsay
rule in accordance with the provisions of Article 3737(e), Vernon's
Texas Statutes Annotated.
Comments
Article 3737(e) of the Civil Statutes is the Texas counterpart of Federal
Rules 803(6) and (7) and is applicable in criminal as well as civil cases. It
should be noted that Texas courts have used the statutory requirement of
"personal knowledge" to limit the exception to primary hearsay rather than
admitting hearsay on hearsay.' 3 Also, without apparent statutory authority,
Texas courts have imposed certain limitations on the admissibility of medi-
cal diagnoses that appear in hospital records.'1
(7) Public records and reports. Public records and reports shall be
admitted into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule in accord-
ance with the provisions of Article 3731(a), Vernon's Texas Statutes
Annotated, and related statutes.
177. See Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARV. L. REV. 461 (1929).
178. Dixon v. Huggins, 495 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, writ dism'd) (title to
real property); Carter v. Carter, 391 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, no writ)
(statement by deceased as to ownership of cash account used against administrator of estate);
Henderson v. Frio County, 362 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1962, no writ)(dedication of road by predecessor in title); Ballard v. Ballard, 296 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1956, no writ) (statement of insured used against main beneficiary of life
insurance policy). Most of these cases are explainable as declarations against interest. See 2 C.
MCCORMICK & R. RAY, supra note 28, §§ 1165-1179.
179. Sorell v. State, 74 Tex. Crim. 100, 167 S.W. 356 (1914); Fire Ass'n v. Nami, 77 S.W.2d
260 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1934, no writ).
180. Wood v. State, 511 S.W.2d 37, 44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); General Accident v. Camp,
348 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1961, no writ).
181. Wood v. State, 511 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Fort Worth & D.C. Ry. v.
Garlington, 92 S.W. 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906, no writ).
182. See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 503 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
183. See, e.g., Skillern & Sons v. Rosen, 359 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1962).
184. See, e.g., Loper v. Andrews, 404 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1966).
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Comments
Article 3731(a) of the Civil Statutes is the Texas counterpart of Federal
Rules 803(8)-(10). There are other related statutes exempting various public
records from the hearsay rule,185 but article 3731(a) seems to incorporate all
of them and to provide fully the exception needed in this area. Again the
courts have imposed additional standards such as a requirement that opin-
ions be by qualified persons 86 and have consistently closed the second
hearsay door.""
(8) Prior statements of identification. A statement of identification
of a person made after perceiving that person and made by a declarant
who testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination
concerning such statement.188
(9) Records of religious organizations. Statement of births, mar-
riages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or
marriage, or other similar facts of personal or family history, contained
in a regularly kept record of a religious organization.
Comments
There is no specific Texas authority supporting or rejecting this exception
found in Federal Rule 803(11). Most religious organizations would qualify as
a "business" under section (4) of article 3737(e) of the Civil Statutes but
many of the records referred to might fall short of the basic requirements of
section (1) of that statute. Despite the lack of authority, the exception is so
innocuous and so free from possible injustice that it has been retained.
(10) Marriage, baptismal and similar certificates. Statements of
fact contained in a certificate that the maker performed a marriage or
other ceremony or administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman,
public official, or other person authorized by the rules or practices of a
religious organization or by law to perform the act certified, and pur-
porting to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable
time thereafter.
Comments
Again there is no specific Texas authority confirming or denying this
exception found in Federal Rule 803(12). Most marriage certificates are on
record in a county clerk's office and hence are admissible under article
3731(a). As with rule 803(9) above, this exception appears innocuous and
uncontroversial and is retained here for the sake of symmetry.
(11) Records concerning family history or relating to interest in
property. Statements of fact concerning personal or family history or
pedigree, or statements purporting to establish or reflect an interest in
property contained in any document or in a properly recorded duplicate
thereof, provided that the document conforms to and is recorded for the
time and in the manner prescribed by section 52 of the Texas Probate
185. See generally TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 3718-3737(c) (Vernon 1926 & Supp.
1976-77).
186. Combined Am. Ins. Co. v. McCall, 497 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
187. See, e.g., Smith v. Riviere, 248 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1951, no writ).
188. See note 155 supra. This exception embodies the same concept as FED. R. EvID.
801(1)(c) which presents it as non-hearsay.
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Code, Article 3726, Vernon's Texas Statutes Annotated, and/or Article
3726(a), Vernon's Texas Statutes Annotated.
Comments
This rule is a codification of the subject matter covered by Federal Rules
803(13)-(15). Federal Rule 803(13), providing an exception for matters of
family history or pedigree contained in "family Bibles, genealogies, charts,
engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns,
crypts, tombstones, or the like," would not be acceptable in Texas as
several cases have imposed a requirement that the declarant be unavailable
for such evidence. '9 An exception reflecting Federal Rule 803(13) is encom-
passed in rule 804. Documents containing such statements of family or
personal history as well as documents containing statements affecting an
interest in property, being the subject matter of Federal Rules 803(14) and
(15), are admissible in Texas.
(12) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in
existence thirty years or more the authenticity of which is established.
Comments
Texas recognizes the ancient documents exception embodied in Federal
Rule 803(16) but extends the time to thirty years.19° This exception usually
applies where there is a problem of authenticity but also has been employed
to admit, for the truth of their contents, recitals in a letter,191 recitals in a
deed, 92 and even recitals in a sixty-nine-year old amended petition. 93 This
latter situation strains the policy of the exception as no reliability emanates
from allegations in pleadings regardless of their age.
(13) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations,
tabulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally
used and relied upon by the public or persons in particular occupa-
tions. 194
Comment on Omission of Federal Rule 803(18)
Federal Rule 803(18) provides an exception for learned treatises called to
the attention of an expert during testimony. Texas does not recognize such
an exception and allows learned treatises to be used only to test the expert's
opinion and not as primary evidence. 95 Even then, the expert must agree
that the treatise is authoritative before it can be used.'96
189. Summerhill v. Darrow, 94 Tex. 71, 57 S.W. 942 (1900); Carter v. Barnes, 25 S.W.2d 606
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1930, holding approved); Wolf v. Wilhelm, 146 S.W. 216 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1912, writ ref'd).
190. Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Staley Oil Co., 138 Tex. 198, 158 S.W.2d 293 (1942); Emory v.
Bailey, I I Tex. 337, 234 S.W. 660 (1921).
191. Smith v. Lynn, 152 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1941, nowrit).
192. Corder v. Foster, 505 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
193. Moore v. Horn, 359 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
194. This exception is well recognized in Texas. See, e.g., American Bankers Ins. Co. v.
Fish, 412 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1967, no writ) (official directory of AMA
admitted to prove hospital approval); McMillen Feeds, Inc. v. Harlow, 405 S.W.2d 123 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (charts showing food value of turkey feed admitted).
195. Bowles v. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1, 219 S.W.2d 779 (1949); Simms v. Southwest Tex.
Methodist Hosp., 535 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
196. Bowles v. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1, 219 S.W.2d 779 (1949); Seeley v. Eaton, 506 S.W.2d
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(14) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation
among members of his family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or
among his associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth,
adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood,
adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of his personal or
family history.
Comments
The exception recognized by Federal Rule 803(19) has allowed proof in
Texas of a person's death and manner of death,"9 of the date of arrival in
Texas,' 98 of marriage,199 age, 2° ° and matters of pedigree.2"' There is some
indication that matters of pedigree can be proved only by family reputa-
tion;202 this proviso, however, is so artificial, so illogical, and so complicat-
ing, and matters of pedigree are so susceptible of direct proof in most cases,
that it is ignored in the above rule.
(15) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputa-
tion in a community, arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of
or customs affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to
events of general history important to the community or state or nation
in which located.
Comments
Texas admits evidence of reputation as to boundaries which arises before
the controversy as prescribed by Federal Rule 803(20).203 There is no Texas
case admitting or excluding reputation as to matters of history but the phrase
is retained to bridge the narrow gap between well-publicized events which
require direct proof and historical events subject to judicial notice.
(16) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character
among his associates or in the community.
Comments
The Texas law on this subject has been codified in rules 405 and 608. As
shown in the comments to those rules, the Texas law with reference to
reputation as to character is limited to reputation in the community. 2°4 The
federal rule allowing expansion of this principle to include the person's
associates is more redundant than substantial and, thus, has been retained.
719, 723 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (requirement, though
followed, characterized as "harsh").
197. Byers v. Wallace, 87 Tex. 503, 28 S.W. 1056 (1894).
198. Keck v. Woodward, 116 S.W. 75 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, writ ref'd).
199. Schwingle v. Keifer, 135 S.W. 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911), aff'd, 105 Tex. 609, 153 S.W.
1132 (1912).
200. Jaffe v. Deckard, 261 S.W. 390 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1924, writ ref'd).
201. Byers v. Wallace, 87 Tex. 503, 28 S.W. 1066 (1894); Gibson v. Dickson, 178 S.W. 44
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1915, writ ref'd).
202. Byers v. Wallace, 87 Tex. 503, 28 S.W. 1066 (1894); Gibson v. Dickson, 178 S.W. 44
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1915, writ ref'd); Schwingle v. Keifer, 135 S.W. 194 (Tex. Civ. App.
1911), aff'd, 105 Tex. 609, 153 S.W. 1132 (1913).
203. Clark v. Hiles, 67 Tex. 141, 2 S.W. 356 (1886); Seaway Co. v. Attorney Gen., 375
S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
204. Smith v. State, 414 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). See also the cases cited above
under rules 405 and 608.
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Comment on Omission of Federal Rules 803(22) and (23)
Federal Rule 803(22) allows evidence of a judgment of final conviction to
be admitted in a subsequent trial "to prove any fact essential to sustain the
judgment." This is unacceptable in Texas 05 and is not a lamentable omis-
sion. In most cases a jury unjustifiably will tend to give conclusive weight to
the action of a former jury, causing the judge to reject the evidence under
the authority now codified as rule 403.20
Federal Rule 803(23) would admit judgments as proof of matters of
personal, family, or general history, or boundaries, essential to the judg-
ment, if the same would be provable by evidence of reputation. Worthy as
this exception may be, in Texas such judgments will stand or fall in accord-
ance with their compliance with articles 3726(a) and 373 l(a).207 The admissi-
bility of judgments in these instances is, therefore, dealt with in rules 803(7)
and 803(11).
(17) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any
of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts;
and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interest of justice
will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. How-
ever, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently in
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement
and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declar-
ant, if obtainable.
Comments
The catch-all provision of Federal Rule 803(24) embodied here has no
specific Texas support, but the Texas courts have never placed a lid on
exceptions to the hearsay rule and are free to consider any reasonably
reliable evidence whether or not categorized under established rules. In fact,
all of the exceptions from 803(8) to 803(16) could be omitted and left to the
reasonable discretion of the trial judge under this catch-all exception, if and
when such evidence is presented. The phrase "if obtainable" has been
added to the requirement in the federal rule that the name and address of the
declarant be given to the opponent in advance of trial. 2°
205. Arnold v. State, 148 Tex. Crim. 310, 186 S.W.2d 995 (1945); Smith v. White, 216
S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stewart v. Profit, 146 S.W. 563
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1912, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
206. Possibly the exception would be justifiable in a civil action brought by a criminal
defendant for purposes of profiting from his own crime. See, e.g., Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v.
Ferrara, 277 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1960).
207. See Wood v. Paulus, 524 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
208. This is probably unnecessary in all but the strictest courts. However, in the case which
begat this rule, Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.
1961), the declarant's name and address are unknown.
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Rule 804
HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS; DECLARANT UNAVAILABLE
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" in-
cludes situations in which the declarant-
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege
from testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of
his statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his
statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of
death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement
has been unable to procure his attendance or testimony by process or
other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal,
claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement
or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the purpose of
preventing the witness from attending or testifying.
Comments
A leading Texas case states that unavailability "means in Texas that the
witness is dead, or that he had become insane, or is physically unable to
testify, or is beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or 'that his whereabouts is
unknown and that diligent search has been made to ascertain where he is, or
that he has been kept away from the trial by the adverse party.' "2°9 There is
also authority recognizing that a proper invocation of a privilege establishes
unavailability. 210 Although there is no support for the obstinacy described in
section (2), or for the lack of memory described in section (3), these should
be retained as they represent legitimate conditions of unavailability if
genuine. If spurious, the trial court retains the discretion under the last
paragraph of the rule to exclude the hearsay evidence pursuant to a finding
of availability.
The Texas courts are very strict about the requirements of section (5),
holding that there must be a showing not only that the witness is absent and
away from the jurisdiction of the court, but also that his deposition could not
have been taken in advance of trial.2 '
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another
hearing of the same or a different proceeding, if the party against
whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceed-
ing, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive
to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. In
a criminal proceeding, the use of testimony taken by way of deposi-
tion is controlled by the provisions of Article 39.12, Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure.
209. Hall v.. White, 525 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. 1975). The conditions described in this
quotation all fit under rule 804(a)(5).
210. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Heard & Jones Drug Stores, Inc., 446 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1969, no writ).
211. See Hall v. White, 525 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. 1975). See also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.




The Texas rule in this area of hearsay exceptions is substantially the same
as the federal rule.212 The major difference concerns the use of depositions
taken in the same case, which are freely available in Texas civil cases. 213 In
criminal cases a showing of unavailability is required for use of deposi-
tions;214 hence, the additional sentence. Texas courts have not required an
identity of issues 215 or identity of parties, 2t 6 thus the language of the federal
rules relaxing such requirement is appropriate.
(2) Dying declarations. The dying declaration of a deceased person
may be offered in evidence, either for or against a defendant charged
with the homicide of such deceased person, under the restrictions
hereafter provided. To render the declarations of the deceased com-
petent evidence, it must be satisfactorily proved:
1. That at the time of making such declaration he was conscious of
approaching death, and believed there was no hope of recovery;
2. That such declaration was voluntarily made, and not through the
persuasion of any person;
3. That such declaration was not made in answer to interrogatories
calculated to lead the deceased to make any particular statement; and
4. That he was of sane mind at the time of making the declaration.
Comments
Rule 804(b)(2) incorporates article 38.20 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. It is more restrictive than Federal Rule 804(b)(2) in that it limits
the use of dying declarations to cases in which the defendant is charged with
the homicide of the declarant and requires that the declarant be deceased.
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of
its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary
interest, including statements detrimental to the declarant's civil
cause of action or defense in pending or proposed litigation, that a
reasonable man in his position would have made the statement unless
he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant
to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admis-
sible unless the State is relying solely upon circumstantial evidence,
the guilt of the declarant is inconsistent with the guilt of the accused
and the facts show that the declarant was so situated that he might
have committed the crime.
Comments
Federal Rule 804(b)(3) has been altered here to reflect the Texas law
accurately with respect to statements against penal interest tending to excul-
pate the accused. Such statements are allowed in criminal cases, but only
212. Lone Star Gas Co. v. State, 137 Tex. 279, 308, 153 S.W.2d 681,697 (1941); Cumpston v.
State, 155 Tex. Crim. 385, 235 S.W.2d 446 (1950).
213. TEX. R. Civ. P. 213.
214. Cumpston v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 385, 235 S.W.2d 446 (1950); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 39.12 (Vernon 1966).
215. See, e.g., Bryant v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 411 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
216. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Lee, 165 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App-Galveston 1942, writ
ref'd); Security Realty & Dev. Co. v. Bunch, 143 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1940,
writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
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under circumstances set forth in the rule.21 7 It is not clear whether state-
ments against penal interest are allowed in civil cases, but since most such
statements also involve civil liability the issue is moot. Assuming the declar-
ant is unavailable, 2 8 the federal rule and this codification of the Texas rule
are substantially similar in all other respects.
219
(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement con-
cerning the declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legiti-
macy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry or other
similar fact of personal or family history, even though declarant had
no means of acquiring personal knowledge of the matter stated; or (B)
a statement concerning the foregoing matters, and death also, of
another person, if the declarant was related to the other by blood,
adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the other's
family as to be likely to have accurate information concerning the
matter declared.
Comments
Since article 3731(a) provides for the admissibility of the ever-increasing
accumulation of vital statistics and other records, the need to establish
pedigree and family history through the hearsay exception found in rule
804(b)(4) will probably diminish with time. With minor differences, Texas
cases have followed the provisions of Federal Rule 804(b)(4). Statements
concerning the declarant's own history have been admitted 220 as well as
statements concerning another person, 221 even when the declarant was not
part of the family. 222 Additionally, Texas courts have required the statement
to be made prior to the beginning of the controversy. 223 This exception
appears to be broad enough to encompass declarations "contained in family
bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family por-
traits, engravings on urns, crypts, tombstones, or the like," as described in
Federal Rule 803(13), and authorizes the admission of such declarations in
Texas upon a showing that the declarant is unavailable.
224
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any
of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the
statement is offered as evidence of a materal fact; (B) the statement is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence when the proponent can procure through reasonable
efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests
217. See Cameron v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 29, 217 S.W.2d 23 (1949), and cases cited therein.
See also Woodard v. State, 463 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
218. Big Mack Trucking Co. v. Dickerson, 497 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. 1973).
219. See Duncan v. Smith, 393 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1965) (interests to be determined "at time
of making").
220. Lowder v. Schluter, 78 Tex. 103, 14 S.W. 205 (1890); Simpson v. Simpson, 380 S.W.2d
855 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
221. Bowden v. Caldron, 554 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ pending);
Smith v. Lynn, 152 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1941, no writ).
222. Howard v. Russell, 75 Tex. 171, 12 S.W. 525 (1889) (recitals in Masonic Lodge
records); Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (employee's declaration).
223. See, e.g., Nehring v. McMurrian, 94 Tex. 45, 57 S.W. 943 (1900).
224. See cases cited note 189 supra. See also Sherrill v. Estate of Plumley, 514 S.W.2d 286
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which casts some doubt upon this
rule when the declarant's identity is unknown. Such matters are, however, always subject to ad
hoc variation, and, as previously suggested, are better left to trial court discretion under catch-
all provisions than to inflexible and complicating rules.
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of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this
exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to
offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and
address of the declarant, if obtainable.225
Rule 805
HEARSAY WITHIN HEARSAY
Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay
rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule provided in these rules.226
Rule 806
ATTACKING AND SUPPORTING CREDIBILITY
OF DECLARANT
When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, the credi-
bility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be support-
ed, by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if
declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct
by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with his hearsay statement, is
not subject to any requirement that he may have been afforded an
opportunity to deny or explain. If the party against whom a hearsay
statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is
entitled to examine him on the statement as if under cross-examination.
Comments
Except for the last sentence, this rule enjoys general support in Texas.227
The last sentence is probably contrary to rule 186 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure. It is adopted here, however, and should be interpreted as leaving
the decision regarding cross-examination to the discretion of the trial judge
depending on the identity of the declarant and the nature of the hearsay
statement.
ARTICLE IX-AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION
Rule 901
REQUIREMENT OF AUTHENTICATION OR IDENTIFICATION
(a) Whenever the relevance of a particular item of evidence de-
pends upon its relationship to, or identification with, a person or object,
such relationship or identification must be shown by satisfactory evi-
dence, and, unless the circumstances show a genuine dispute or raise
suspicions concerning such relationship or identification, the admissi-
bility of such item of evidence shall be favored.
225. This catch-all provision is proper and useful for the same reasons as are set forth in the
comment to rule 803(17). When the declarant is unavailable the need for this provision in-
creases. It should be clearly understood that when the declarant is unavailable the requirement
to produce the declarant's name and address will not be inflexible.
226. Rule 805 has long enjoyed support in Texas. See, e.g., Skillern & Sons v. Rosen, 359
S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1%2).
227. Mitchell v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 530, 222 S.W. 983 (1920); Hamblin v. State, 34 Tex.
Crim. 368, 30 S.W. 1075 (1895).
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Comments
Federal Rule 901(a) has little or no meaning. Presumably, it represents an
effort to reduce authentication requirements to a minimum. Rule 901(a), as
drafted here, better presents the matter in light of the fact that Texas
expressly requires authentication. An item of evidence must be connected to
the person or object from which it purports to emanate.228 Texas courts,
however, are relatively relaxed about the quality and quantity of proof
needed, particularly in the absence of a genuine dispute. 229
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of
limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification
conforming with the requirement of this rule:
(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony that a matter
is what it is claimed to be. 2
30
(2) Non-expert opinion on handwriting. Non-expert opinion as to
the genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired
for purposes of the litigation.
2fl
(3) Comparison by trier or expert witness. Comparison by the trier
of fact or by expert witnesses with specimens which have been
authenticated. 232
(4) Distinctive characteristics and the like. Appearance, contents,
substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, ta-
ken in conjunction with circumstances.
Comments
The meaning of this last provision is not clear. The Advisory Committee
comments to Federal Rule 901(b)(4) indicate that it is intended to encompass
authentication by circumstantial evidence. The examples given are cases
where a telephone conversant is identified by reference to that person's
peculiar and individual knowledge and where letters are authenticated by
their contents which express facts known only by the alleged author. If this
be the intent of this provision, Texas accepts such circumstantial authentica-
tion.233 The federal rule also permits authentication by "distinctive charac-
teristics" such as fingerprints. This also is accepted in Texas.1 4
228. Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Lemke, 365 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. 1963) (railway speed tape must be
connected to point on ground to be relevant); Hicks v. State, 545 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Crim. App.
1977); Luna v. State, 493 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Goetz v. Goetz, 534 S.W.2d 716
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
229. See, e.g., Robertson v. Du Bose, 76 Tex. 1, 13 S.W. 300 (1890); Binyon v. State, 545
S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); TEX. R. Civ. P. 93(h), (i).
230. This provision could be eliminated without significant loss. It remains, however,
because it is consistent with Texas case law permitting simple testimony that a matter is what it
is claimed to be. For a good illustration see Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Slaughter, 111 S.W.2d 362
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1937, no writ). In that case the Texas Standard Fire Insurance
provisions were authenticated by an experienced agent's testimony rather than by a certified
copy of the provisions on file with the Insurance Commission. See also Binyon v. State, 545
S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Luna v. State, 493 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
231. This provision is perfectly consistent with longstanding Texas authority. See Garner v.
State, 100 Tex. Crim. 626, 272 S.W. 167 (1925). See also Janak v. Security Lumber Co., 513
S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ).
232. Rule 901(b)(3) is supported by TEX. Rnv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 3737(b) (Vernon Supp.
1976-77) and by TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.27 (Vernon 1966).
233. Gleason v. Davis, 155 Tex. 467, 289 S.W.2d 228 (1956).
234. See, e.g., Xanthull v. State, 403 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (palmprints);
Matula v. State, 390 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965) (fingerprints); Martinez v. State, 169
Tex. Crim. 229, 333 S.W.2d 370 (1960) (shoe marks).
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(5) Voice identification. Identification of a voice, whether heard
firsthand or through a mechanical or electronic transmission or re-
cording, by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time under
circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker. 23
(6) Telephone Conversations. Telephone conversations, by evi-
dence that a call was made to the number assigned at the time by the
telephone company to a particular person or business, if circum-
stances, including self-identification, show the person answering to
be the one called or to be a representative of the business called.
Comments
The federal rule is simplified by this version without any loss of import.
The Texas cases involving identification of telephone conversants do not
recognize the distinction made by the federal rule between business and
personal calls. They have allowed identification by dialing the person or
business at the assigned number, by self-identification, or by other circum-
stances that indicate the recipient of the call is the person or business
intended.236
(7) Public records or reports. Authentication of public records
and reports as provided in Article 3731(a), Vernon's Texas Statutes
Annotated .237
(8) Ancient documents or data compilation. Evidence that a doc-
ument or data compilation, in any form, (A) is in such condition as to
create no suspicion concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a place
where it, if authentic, would likely be, and (C) has been in existence
thirty years or more at the time it is offered. 238
(9) Process or system. Evidence describing a process or system
used to produce a result and showing that the process or system
produces an accurate result.
Comments
The Advisory Committee comment to Federal Rule 901(b)(9) states that
this provision is intended to authenticate X-ray photographs and computer
print-outs or evidence of similar nature. Texas statutes and court decisions
recognize the admissibility of such exhibits if certain standards are estab-
lished that tend to show that "the process or system produces an accurate
result.' '239
235. Rule 901(b)(5) allows identification of a voice in a manner comparable to authentication
of handwriting under §§ (2) and (3) and likewise enjoys support in Texas. See, e.g., Gleason v.
Davis, 155 Tex. 467, 289 S.W.2d 228 (1956); Edwards v. State, 551 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977) (voice recording identified by witness who was present at original conversation);
France v. State, 148 Tex. Crim. 341, 187 S.W.2d 80 (1945) (prosecutrix' screams heard by
bystander); McKee v. State, 118 Tex. Crim. 479, 42 S.W.2d 77 (1931) (defendant's voice as
heard in jail).
236. Gleason v. Davis, 155 Tex. 467, 289 S.W.2d 228 (1956); Colbert v. Dallas Joint Stock
Land Bank, 136 Tex. 268, 150 S.W.2d 771 (1941); City of Ingleside v. Stewart, 554 S.W.2d 939
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ pending).
237. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3731(a) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) freely provides for
authentication of public records and reports. This is the subject matter of FED. R. EVID.
901(b)(7).
238. The addition of 10 more years to the 20-year period provided in the federal rule brings it
into conformity with Texas law. See, e.g., Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Staley Oil Co., 138 Tex. 198,
158 S.W.2d 293 (1942); Emory v. Bailey, Ill Tex. 337, 234 S.W. 660 (1921).
239. Edwards v. State, 551 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (voice recordings); Hernan-
dez v. State, 530 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (spectograph analysis); Railroad Comm'n
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(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of authenti-
cation or identification provided by Act of the Legislature or by other
rules authoritatively prescribed by courts.
Rule 902
SELF-AUTHENTICATION
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admis-
sibility is not required with respect to the following:
(1) Public documents. The authenticity and admissibility of public
documents, foreign, domestic and federal, sealed or unsealed, shall
be proved in accordance with Article 3731(a), Vernon's Texas Stat-
utes Annotated and also, when and as applicable, with Articles 3718-
3722; Articles 3724-3726; Article 3726(b); Articles 3727-3731; Article
3731(b); Article 3731(c); or Article 3734(a); 3735; 3737; 3737(a);
3737(c), Vernon's Texas Statutes Annotated. 240
(2) Newspapers and periodicals. Printed materials purporting to be
newspapers or periodicals. 241
(3) Trade inscriptions and the like. Inscriptions, signs, tags, or
labels purporting to have been affixed in the course of business and
indicating ownership, control, or origin. 242
(4) Acknowledged documents. Documents accompanied by a cer-
tificate of acknowledgment executed in the manner provided by law
by a notary public or other officer authorized by law to take acknow-
ledgments .24-
(5) Commercial paper. Commercial paper, signatures thereon, and
documents relating thereto to the extent provided by general com-
mercial law.
Comments
The Uniform Commercial Code as enacted in Texas provides for self-
authentication of third party instruments, such as bills of lading and bailee
receipts,2 ' negotiable instruments, 245 and protests and notices of dishon-
or.246 The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure require a sworn denial of the
execution "of any instrument in writing, upon which any pleading is found-
v. Southern Pac. Co., 468 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (com-
puters); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3737(e), § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) (X-rays); TEX.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701(l)-(5) (Vernon 1977) (alcohol breath test).
240. These statutes, in varying degrees of importance and applicability, comprise the Texas
law with respect to the authentication of public records and supersede FED. R. EVID. 902(l)-(5).
The most important of these, and probably the only one necessary to this codification is TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3731(a) (Vernon Supp. 1976177).
241. No Texas authority expressly supports or rejects FED. R. EVID. 902(6), but the likeli-
hood of someone forging an entire newspaper or periodical for purposes of litigation is so
remote that the rule would undoubtedly be adopted by any Texas court confronted with the
problem.
242. FED. R. EVID. 902(7) is retained without express Texas authority for reasons similar to
those expressed under rule 902(2).
243. FED. R. EVID. 902(8) is well supported by Texas statutory and case law. See TEX. REV.
CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 3723 (Vernon 1926). See also Reed v. Beheler, 198 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1946, no writ) (an acknowledgement is "self-proving and needs no
supporting evidence"); Stout v. Oliveira, 153 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941, writ
ref'd w.o.m.) (acknowledgment creates prima facie case of fact of execution). But see
Olschewske v. Smyth, 62 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1933, no writ), which is not,
however, thought to be authoritative.
244. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.202 (Tex. UCC Vernon 1975).
245. Id. § 3.307.
246. Id. § 3.510.
1977]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ed" and "of the genuineness of the endorsement or assignment of a written




(6) Presumptions under Acts of Legislature. Any signature, docu-
ment, or other matter declared by Act of the Legislature to be
presumptively or prima facie genuine or authentic.
Rule 903
SUBSCRIBING WITNESS' TESTIMONY UNNECESSARY
The testimony of a subscribing witness is not necessary to authenti-
cate a writing unless specifically required by legislation applicable to
the type of writing in question.
Comments
The most common form of instrument requiring subscribing witnesses is a
will and the Texas Probate Code provides a self-proving procedure for such
documents. 248 Other types of writings in which subscribing witnesses are
commonly used, such as oil and gas division orders, releases, and some
contracts are normally authenticated by the simple proceedings outlined in
rule 901(b)(2). The final clause of rule 903 thus applies to a will that is not
self-proving and in other areas, if any, where legislation requires the tes-
timony of a subscribing witness.
ARTICLE X-CONTENTS OF WRITINGS,
RECORDINGS [AND PHOTOGRAPHS] 249
Rule 1001
DEFINITIONS
For purposes of this article the following definitions are applicable:
(1) Writings and recordings. "Writings" and "recordings" consist
of letters, words, or numbers, or their equivalent, set down by hand-
writing, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, magnetic
impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or other form of data
compilation.
[(2) Photographs. "Photographs" include still photographs, X-ray
films, video tapes, and motion pictures.]
(3) Original. An "original" of a writing or recording is the writing
or recording itself or any counterpart intended to have the same
effect by a person executing or issuing it. [An "original" of a photo-
graph includes the negative or any print therefrom.] If data are stored
in a computer or similar device, any printout or other output readable
by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an "original."
(4) Duplicate. A "duplicate" is a counterpart produced by the
same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by
means of photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by
mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction,
247. TEX. R. Civ. P. 93(h), (i).
248. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1956).
249. References to photographs are bracketed in deference to Texas authority exempting
photographs, including X-rays, from the best evidence rule. Henriksen v. State, 500 S.W.2d 491
(Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (best evidence rule applies only to documents and not to photographs);
Kollmorgan v. Scott, 447 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, no writ) (X-
rays are not subject to best evidence rule). The references to photographs are not totally deleted
because of the logic of applying the same rules to photographs, including X-rays, as to writings
and recordings.
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or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduce the
original.
Comments
The definitions contained herein concern layman's terms and obviously
no Texas cases support them. They are useful, if not essential, to the
remaining provisions of article X. The definition of "duplicate," insofar as
it favors certain types of secondary evidence, is contrary to Texas common
law which recognizes no hierarchy of secondary evidence.250 Important
Texas statutes, however, do give priority to "any photographic, photostatic,
microfilm or other process which accurately reproduces or forms a durable
medium for so reproducing the original. 251
Rule 1002
REQUIREMENT OF ORIGINAL
To prove the content of a writing, recording, [or photograph,] the
original writing, recording, [or photograph] is required, except as other-
wise provided in these rules or by Act of the Legislature.
Comments
The best evidence rule embodied in Federal Rule 1002 has been seriously
wounded in Texas by articles 3731(b) and 3731(c) of the Civil Statutes.
Article 3731(b) applies to public and business records and admits reliable
duplicates without qualification. Article 3731(c) applies to "a writing or
written instrument" and admits such duplicates "where the party using the
same, at the time of its offer in evidence either produces the original or
reasonably accounts for its absence, or where there is no bona fide dispute
as to its being an accurate reproduction of the original. 252 Thus, the com-
mon law best evidence rule is applicable only when the secondary evidence
does not qualify under either statute or, with respect to private writings or
written instruments, only in the absence of the circumstances set forth in
article 3731(c). Insofar as it remains applicable, however, the common law
best evidence rule as expressed in many Texas cases is consistent with the
federal rule as set forth above. 253
Rule 1003
ADMISSIBILITY OF DUPLICATES
A duplicate is admissible under and according to the provisions of
Articles 3731(b) and 3731(c), Vernon's Texas Statutes Annotated.
Comments
Federal Rule 1003 admits a duplicate unless "(1) a genuine question is
250. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Klein, 160 Tex. 61, 325 S.W.2d 376 (1959); Simpson Bank v. Smith,
114 S.W. 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no writ).
251. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 3731(b), (c) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
252. Id. art. 3731(c).
253. See, e.g., Lumpkin v. State, 524 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Clement v. Nacol,
542 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ). In Cage v. State, 167 Tex. Crim.
355, 320 S.W.2d 364 (1958), the court recognized that the best evidence rule applies only when
the contents of a writing are to be proved; thus, the time of the issuance of the permit was held
not subject to the rule. This, of course, is consistent with the federal rule as stated.
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raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it
would be unfair to admit a duplicate in lieu of the original. 254 The Texas
statutes codified in rule 1003 accomplish approximately the same result,
since the federal definition of a duplicate is substantially the same as that in
the Texas statutes. Literally, the Texas statutes go further with respect to
duplicates of public and business records because the admissibility of these
is not dependent upon the absence of a genuine dispute over their authentici-
ty. As a practical matter, however, if a genuine dispute were raised in Texas
concerning a duplicate of a public or business record, and the original were
available, the original would either be produced or the duplicate given no
weight by the fact finder.
Rule 1004
ADMISSIBILITY OF OTHER EVIDENCE OF CONTENTS
The original is not required, and other evidence of the contents of a
writing, recording, [or photograph] is admissible if
(1) Originals lost or destroyed. All originals are lost or have been
destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith.
Comments
Texas excuses compliance with the best evidence rule when the original is
shown to have been legitimately destroyed25 or lost,256 assuming the de-
struction is not deliberate and unexplained. 257 Even in this latter situation, if
the deliberate destruction was not at the hands of the proponent of the
evidence, the rule is inapplicable. 258
(2) Original not obtainable. No original can be obtained by any
available judicial process or procedure. 21 9
(3) Original in possession of opponent. At a time when an original
was under the control of the party against whom offered, he was put on
notice, by the pleadings or otherwise, that the contents would be a
subject of proof at the hearing, and he does not produce the original at
the hearing. 21
(4) Collateral matters. The writing, recording, or [photograph] is
not closely related to a controlling issue. 261
254. FED. R. EvID. 1003.
255. Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 492 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1973, no writ).
256. Stucker v. Spindler, 441 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969, no writ).
257. Massie v. Hutcheson, 270 S.W. 544 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, jdgmt adopted).
258. Womack v. State, 145 Tex. Crim. 551, 170 S.W.2d 478 (1943). In that case the rape
victim, not the state, deliberately destroyed letters written to her by the defendant. Thus, she
was allowed to testify as to their contents.
259. This excuse is also accepted in Texas. Missouri K.T. Ry. v. Dillworth, 95 Tex. 327, 67
S.W. 88 (1902); Standard Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bayless, 338 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Where the original is shown to be outside the jurisdiction of
the court, no effort to obtain it need be shown. See Haire v. State, 118 Tex. Crim. 16, 39 S.W.2d
70 (1931).
260. McConnell Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co., 428 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1968).
261. In Texas "[i]t is well settled ... that evidence relating to a matter which does not form
the foundation of a cause, or the defense thereto, but is collateral to the issue, does not properly
fall within the best evidence rule .... ." Freeman v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 317
S.W.2d 563, 568 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Bouknight v.
Langdeau, 333 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1959), aff'd, 162 Tex. 42, 344 S.W.2d 435
(1961).
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TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE
Comment on Omission of Federal Rule 1005
Federal Rule 1005 exempts properly certified duplicates of public records
from compliance with the best evidence rule. This is omitted here because it
is fully covered by the provisions of rule 1003 which provide for the admissi-
bility of duplicates of various public business and private documents in




The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, [or photographs]
which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in
the form of a chart, summary, or calculation. The originals, or dupli-
cates, shall be made available for examination or copying, or both, by
other parties at reasonable time and place. The court may order that
they be produced in court.2 62
Rule 1006
TESTIMONY OR WRITTEN ADMISSION OF PARTY
Contents of writings, recordings, [or photographs] may be proved by
the testimony or deposition of the party against whom offered or by his
written admission, without accounting for the non-production of the
original.
Comments
Federal Rule 1007 is too obvious to require authority; in fact little authori-
ty is available since an argument contrary to this rule would be untenable
and absurd. There is Texas authority implying that a party may not success-
fully enforce the best evidence rule after having admitted the accuracy of
the secondary evidence involved. 263
Rule 1007
FUNCTIONS OF COURT AND JURY
When the admissibility of other evidence of contents or writings,
recordings [or photographs] under these rules depends upon the fulfill-
ment of a condition of fact, the question whether the condition has been
fulfilled is ordinarily for the court to determine in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 104. However, when an issue is raised (a) whether
the asserted writing ever existed, or (b) whether another writing, re-
cording, [or photograph] produced at the trial is the original, or (c)
whether other evidence of contents correctly reflects the contents, the
issue is for the trier of fact to determine as in the case of other issues of
fact.
Comments
The first part of Federal Rule 1008 conforms to Texas law, which lets the
judge make preliminary decisions concerning any objection under the best
evidence rule. 21 Texas authority is lacking for the second part of the federal
262. The provisions of FED. R. EVID. 1006 find full support in Texas. See, e.g., Black Lake
Pipe Line Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1976).
263. Hoefling v. Hambleton, 84 Tex. 517, 19 S.W. 689 (1892); Mecaskey v. Bewley Mills, 8
S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1928, writ dism'd).
264. Spencer v. Levy, 173 S.W. 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1915, writ ref'd).
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rule. This portion of the rule is retained, however, because it follows the
general concept of jury trials and allows the jury to determine the ultimate
issues in the case even if these issues also determine the admissibility of
certain items of evidence. To provide otherwise would probably amount to a




Unlike most areas of substantive law, which can be carefully researched
in advance of trial, the rules of evidence must often be hastily applied by
both trial lawyers and judges during the trial without an opportunity for
research or reflection. Consequently, the field of evidence is one in which
an authoritative codification is of particular assistance to both the bench and
the bar. My ultimate purpose has been fulfilled only to the extent that this
article represents a positive step in the direction of codifying the rules of
evidence in Texas.
265. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 15. One Texas court resolved a similar problem, in a case where
the evidence at hand was admissible only upon establishing a conspiracy, in a manner indicated
by this rule. The court left the ultimate decision as to the existence of the conspiracy up to the
determination of the jury. Rowley v. Braly, 286 S.W. 241 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1926, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
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